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Abstract
Morality, as used within this dissertation, is conceptualized as having two distinct
components – a shared, norm-based, cultural component and a subjective, character-based,
emotion-based component. Using this dual-aspect model of morality, we examine the roots of
morality using a comparative, 5th-Aim Ethological framework. This ethological framework was
applied to study possible emotional states of the Carolina chickadees. Three experiments are
presented which attempt to identify the most likely proximate emotion for the general call of the
foraging chickadees. These studies examined food presence, food type and volume, and vocal
cues of predator presence. Our data suggest that a homeostatic-related emotion is unlikely to be a
significant proximate emotion for the general call of the chickadee in response to food discovery.
A modest amount of evidence is also presented which suggests that threat-based motivation is
not the dominant proximate emotion for the general call of the Carolina chickadee. In light of
these findings, new motivational hypotheses are presented that may explain the subjective
motivation elements preceding the chickadee call. We conclude with some scientific and
philosophical parallels of our morality model, and some implications for the scientific
investigation of morality.
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CHAPTER 1: MORALITY IN ETHOLOGY
A Theoretical Approach and Philosophical Assumptions

“This is my starting point and it could be wrong.” 1

Overview
Moral character is the central motif of this dissertation. To understand the essence of
moral character, it is proposed, requires the identification of certain fundamental emotional
elements comprising morality. The definition of “morality” has differed, to a minor degree,
between cultures, ages, and among the various sciences.2 However, these definitions usually
possess a common element of a shared set of social norms, or expectations, which govern the
behavior of a particular group. Morality, as used within this dissertation, is conceptualized as
having two components – a shared, norm-based, cultural component and a subjective, characterbased, emotion-based component. The distinction between these two uses of morality will be
explained in greater detail later in this chapter.
We begin this dissertation with a brief description of the philosophical assumptions which
underlie our framework, methodology, and interpretations. We offer this assumptions as part of a
general disclosure concerning our perspective on the science of animal sentience. These
philosophical assumptions are followed by a description of the ethological framework we used to
conceptualize morality. This framework assumes that evolutionary pressures had a major role in

Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: The unity of knowledge. Vintage. p. 263.
Gert, Bernard and Gert, Joshua, "The Definition of Morality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/moralitydefinition/>.
1
2

1

shaping morality and that both humans and animals possess a capacity for experiential,3
henceforth motivational, states.4 These evolutionary pressures and use of subjective capacities,
and their respective roles in morality, are also expanded upon below.
Several empirical studies, found in the third and fourth chapters of the dissertation, are
part of a comparative (multi-species) approach to identifying some of the fundamental
motivational aspects of moral motivation. Our goal in these studies is to try and determine the
most probable proximate emotion related to the general call of the chickadee. The rationale for
this comparative approach will receive greater treatment in chapter two. The final chapter applies
our framework and empirical findings to other models, described some other possibilities to
expand our framework of morality, and described some dangers with the scientific study of
morality. But before addressing morality as a motivational phenomenon, experienced within
multiple species, we should make some other clarifications are required concerning our basic
philosophical assumptions.

Philosophical Assumptions
The connection between the various sciences and philosophy is not always apparent due
to a common tendency in modern academia to frame science and philosophy as distinct systems
of thought. The sciences, being empirical, are assumed by many to hold greater validity than
mere contributions of philosophy, which have been perceived as producing unfalsifiable,
metaphysical propositions in the past – or even disparaged the empirical study of natural

Bekoff, Marc, and Jessica Pierce (2009). Wild justice: The moral lives of animals. University of Chicago Press, p.
xiii. “…we use the word animals to refer to nonhuman beings because always writing ‘nonhuman animals’ gets
tiresome.”
4
The word motivation is often used to refer to both internal and external forces which shape behavior. Our focus is
on the internal, subjective influences and unless otherwise noted, motivation will be used exclusively to refer to
subjective experiential states influencing behavior.
3
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phenomena.5 As a result, the academic universe is often presented as a collection of the various
arts, humanities, and sciences with philosophy left as a field of residuum comprising a set of
abstract concepts not yet incorporated into one of the sciences.6 This view that philosophy should
play a limited role in scientific scholarship may not be universal. Yet it is prominent enough to
create problems for researchers when they attempt to explain certain phenomena using a
scientific approach.
The central problem in ignoring philosophical questions or subjugating philosophy to the
sciences is that many philosophical assumptions which underlie scientific investigation have
become implicit rather than explicit. Few modern scientists describe their philosophical
assumptions when publishing their findings in scientific journals. There may be several reasons
for this omission. A scientist might assume that their assumptions are so widely shared, or
irrelevant to their topic of study, that to describe them would be superfluous. Geneticists,
studying the role of various gene polymorphisms in the onset of diabetes, perhaps need not state
their assumptions on the nature of epistemology in order to publish their findings in an
epidemiology journal. Conversely, a scientist may hold assumptions that they believe to be out of
the scientific mainstream and to describe them in print would be to invite criticism from
departmental peers, journal editors, or grant reviewers on grounds other than the empirical
evidence they present. Challenging pervasive, mainstream assumptions has never been an easy
task in any discipline.
But whatever the reasons may be for discontinuing the practice of clarifying one’s

For one popular example of this tension see: Damasio, A. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the
human brain. Avon Books.
6
Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: The unity of knowledge. Vintage.
5
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philosophic assumptions, this discontinuance holds certain risks. Implicit assumptions become
hidden to a reader and are difficult to contest. The empirical nature of observation can also
become confused with the inference-based nature of interpretation under a vague notion of
scientific authority.7 A form of objectivity that is not grounded in “the spirit of the age” and that
is applicable across diverse cultures and time periods can become jeopardized.8 For these
reasons, some philosophical groundwork seems fitting prior to addressing the ethological
framework of morality here employed. An excellent example of this turning ones’ philosophical
“cards face up” is provided by E.O. Wilson.9 He encourages everyone who studies moral
reasoning to suffer the indignity of having their personal beliefs clearly understood.10 We agree
with this practice and follow suit accordingly.
Assumption I: The validity of reason as absolute
Reason, as used in this dissertation, is defined as the capacity for applying logical
principles to facts in order to make inferences and to derive valid conclusions. The difference
between humans and animals in this capacity is beyond the scope of this dissertation and will not
here be addressed. Following a series of studies that revealed a failure of many study participants
to properly utilize purely logical reasoning on certain tasks and in certain contexts,11 other
academics have called into question the objective validity of the human faculty of reason.12 13

Ruse, M. (2003) Is evolution a secular religion? Science 299.5612 p. 1523-1524.
Lewis, C. S. (1964). The discarded image: An introduction to medieval and renaissance literature. Cambridge
University Press.
9
Wilson, E. O. (1999). Consilience: The unity of knowledge. Vintage. p.263
10
Ibid.
11
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
12
Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. New York: Pantheon
Books.
13
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 34(2), 57-74.
7
8

4

These skeptics of reason have implied that these empirical examples from social psychology are
evidence that humanity may not be in possession of an objective faculty of reason. We disagree
with this conclusion. It is important to emphasize here that a failure of research participants to
utilize reason in a particular setting is not the same as the questioning the existence of the faculty
of reason itself. There may be many contexts in which human reason is biased, limited, or
underutilized. However, to abandon objective reason wholesale is to simultaneously abandon the
foundation of every system of thought and the ability to create any cogent argument. If the
potential for an objective form of reason is on trial, the rules of logic, science, and whatever
claims the skeptic of reason might present, will share the verdict. Arguments for the denial of
reason are also based upon reason. In short, they are self-refuting.
Assumption II: A parsimonious, yet non-reductive, evolutionary framework
The popular view of evolution often portrays the theory as a scientific monolith.14 In
reality, however, there is a tremendous amount of diverse, and often competing, evolutionary
ideas found within biology and evolutionary psychology.15 We start with Darwin. As will be
discussed in chapter two, Darwin predicted cooperation would occur in species that had
developed offspring care and certain cognitive capacities.16 He also wrote extensively on the role
of emotion and of transmittable “serviceable habits” that could convey adaptive advantages to
individuals. If we take Darwin’s evolutionary theory in general, and as applied to morality, we
would describe it as both parsimonious in its assumptions and comprehensive in applications.
But in the wake of Origin17 some authors have attempted to modify Darwin’s theory for

Ruse, M. (2003) Is evolution a secular religion? Science 299.5612 p. 1523-1524.
Van der Braak, H. (2013). Evolutionary Psychology. Pearson Education Limited.
16
Darwin, Charles (1871). Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man. Murray, London. p. 28.
17
Darwin, Charles (2003). On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. Ed. Joseph Carroll.
14
15
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various other purposes. Spencer attempted to expand upon natural selection to the extent of
conceptualizing the theory as a central component of a constant progression of the universe18 – a
type of cosmic developmentalism. Freud adapted evolutionary principles in order to develop his
psychoanalytic theory and a model of civilization that pitted the eros against a death drive.19
Dawkin’s The Selfish Gene,20 in an apparent attempt to increase the parsimony of natural
selection as a theory, overemphasized the role of genotype versus Darwin’s incorporation of both
genetic and non-genetic inheritance of behavioral traits. The theoretical approach utilized in this
dissertation is Darwinian in that it assumes a significant role for non-genetic inheritance of
behavior and a potential preference for cooperation over competition among conspecifics under
some conditions.
Assumption III: The mind as neither completely district from, nor reducible to, matter
Within the ancient debate concerning the mind’s connection with matter21, this
dissertation assumes a centrist position – avoiding a reduction of mind to mere matter or a
reduction of matter to a mere product of mind. Much of the controversy surrounding mind and
body debate may stem from the acceptance of either a Cartesian or Baconian set of first
principles. Descartes proposed that the existence of a self as a perceiving agent was the most
fundamental axiom of rational thought – summarized in the famous phrase Cogito ergo sum.22
He argued that, though his perception may be in error, the existence of an agent to make the error

Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview.
18
Spencer, Herbert (1876). First principles of a new system of philosophy. D. Appleton.
19
Freud, Sigmund (1961). Civilization and its Discontents. W.W. Norton & Company.
20
Dawkins, Richard (1989). The selfish gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
21
Van Oudenhove, L., & Cuypers, S. E. (2010). The philosophical" mind-body problem" and its relevance for the
relationship between psychiatry and the neurosciences. Perspectives in biology and medicine, 53(4), 545-557.
22
Descartes, René (1968). Discourse on Method and the Meditations. Penguin UK.

6

was more self-evident than any information he could have received through his sensory inputs.
Conversely, Bacon, in his Novum Organum,23 argued that all knowledge is derived from
experience and proposed a system of knowledge be built based on experience alone – heralding
in the modern empirical approach to science.
The theoretical approach developed in this dissertation is neither strictly dualistic, based
on subjective philosophical idealism, nor strictly monistic, based upon assumptions from a
materialistic philosophical realism. Both extremes are here rejected. Cartesian agency, and an
accompanying sentience, is assumed to exist. Evidence supplied from a shared and objective
reality, fundamental to Baconian empiricism, is assumed to be valid. Any attempt to reduce
experience to the mere product of the agent’s mind inevitably leads to solipsism.24 Solipsism, by
definition must be incompatible with a scientific method based on a shared reality. Any attempt
to reduce mind to the mere product of material mechanisms has a strong potential to minimize or
eliminate all subjective phenomena such as sentience, consciousness, or the Umwelt25 of living
creatures. In a field such as psychology, where the object of study, at least in origin, is the mind,
both reductionistic empiricism and solipsistic idealism lead to a dead end in the pursuit of
knowledge.

Bacon, Francis (2016). Novum organum. Jazzybee Verlag.
Solipsism: (a) the theory that the self can be aware of nothing but its own experiences and states; (b) the theory
that nothing exists or is exists or is real but the self. Webster, Noah (1966). Webster’s New Twentieth Century
Dictionary: Second Edition, unabridged. Publishers International Press.
25
Umwelt: the world as it is experienced by a particular organism. Von Uexküll, Jakob (1992). A stroll through the
worlds of animals and men: A picture book of invisible worlds. Semiotica, 89(4), 319-391.
23
24
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An Ethological Framework
With these philosophic assumptions in mind, we can now turn our attention to the
conceptual framework used in this dissertation. Using an ethological approach, the principal goal
is to identify the fundamental motivations that compose a moral character. Ethology was
originally defined in a broad sense as the study of character. But the focus of Ethology has
changed substantially from its etymological roots. Ethology, in origin, is the combination of
ethos, meaning “custom” or “character” and logos, meaning “reason” or “logic.” Thus ethology
was defined as 1) a depicting of character, 2) a treatise on morality, or 3) the science of applied
ethics.26 But as evolutionary theory became more prominent within biology and other sciences, a
new, expanded definition of ethology was required which focused on questions of animal
behavior and incorporated research from multiple fields – including biology, psychology,
physiology, and ecology.27 This expansion was largely provided by early ethologists and
formalized by Niko Tinbergen in his four aims of Ethology.28 29 Tinbergen described four
categories of questions that should be applied concerning the behavior of animals. Two of these
questions involved the biological origins of the behavior. Why a behavior was adaptive within its
present natural context, and why a behavior originally evolved (and being careful not to assume
these questions are identical) are the evolutionary ultimate questions of behavior. The other two
center on are proximate questions focused on either the development of a behavior across the
lifespan of the organism or the immediately causal factors that lead to the display of the behavior

Webster, Noah (1966). Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary: Second Edition, unabridged. Publishers
International Press.
27
Burghardt GM. (1977) The ontogeny of communication. In: Sebeok TA, editor. How Animals Communicate.
Bloomington, Ind, USA: Indiana University Press; pp. 67–93
28
Tinbergen, Niko (1963). On aims and methods of ethology. Ethology, 20(4), 410-433.
26
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– such as the smell of food initiating salivation.
Tinbergen’s four aims have been tremendously beneficial to the field of ethology in
helping expand the understanding of many behaviors, including some aspects of morality.
However, for researchers who do not assume that mind can be reduced to matter, as described
above, or those who conceptualize the mind as an emergent property or interactional force, there
is a missing aim of ethology. Based on these premises, the subjective, motivational elements that
initiate behavior do not fit effortlessly within one of Tinbergen’s four aims. Subjective
motivations are neither observable behavior nor are they stimuli. They therefore cannot be easily
conceptualized as merely part of an evolutionary history, an adaptive advantage, a stage in a
growth process, or as proximate stimuli – although emotion has a connection to all of these types
of aims. Motivations, that is emotions, are, by nature, intangible phenomena that cannot be
directly observed or measured. Their existence can only be inferred by other forms of empirical
evidence.
For this reason this dissertation applies a 5th-Aim ethological approach to the study of
moral character. Using the 5th-Aim, a researcher attempts to discover the subjective experiences,
or the Umwelt, of animals that correspond to behavior.30 An animal may begin to salivate at the
smell of food, but between the objective, external presence of the food and the objective, external
behavior of salivation lies the internal experience of the animal. Just as a human can experience
hunger sensations at the sight of food, animals are assumed by 5th-Aim ethologists to experience
something akin hunger as well. The important point to emphasize here is that animals are thought

Burghardt, G.M. (1997). "Amending Tinbergen: A fifth aim for ethology". In R.W. Mitchell; N. S. Thompson; H.
L. Miles. Anthropomorphism, anecdotes and animals. Albany: State University of New York Press.
30

9

to be able to experience sensations analogous to human hunger, not necessarily the identical
experience of human hunger. Assuming that an animal thinks or feels much like humans might
think or feel in a particular context is an uncritical form of anthropomorphism. What a 5th-Aim
ethologist utilizes when investigating animal experience is a critical form of anthropomorphism.
With critical anthropomorphism, a researcher uses their own subjective experience, along with
multiple other lines of evidence, such as the results of experiments or behavioral patterns
described in ethograms, in order to approximate the subjective state experienced in animals.31
Panksepp’s psycho-neuro-ethological triangulation approach to neuroscience holds many
parallels with critical anthropomorphism.32 Panksepp argues that animal sentience can be
inferred by simultaneously examining three forms of evidence. Neurological homologues of
human motivation, such as certain neurochemical regulators, provide initial evidence that a
similar motivational system exists in other species. If there is additional ethological evidence,
such as a probable shared evolutionary history to the behavior, the probability of animal
sentience increases. Evidence from psychological experiments can also be used to increase the
likelihood that animals possess some form of sentience. If these animals also display similar
patterns to humans within parallel operant learning contexts, such as seeking the same rewards
and avoiding the same punishers, the probability for, and the ability to distinguish between, an
animal’s subjective state increases. Since the chief goal of this dissertation is to discover the
some of the emotional rudiments of morality, an approach based upon critical anthropomorphism
and psycho-neuro-ethological triangulation is warranted. For purposes of brevity, this multi-

Burghardt, Gordon M. (1985). Animal awareness: Current perceptions and historical perspective. American
Psychologist, 40(8), 905.
32
Panksepp, Jaak (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. Consciousness
and cognition, 14(1), 30-80.
31
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evidential method will be summarized as a “5th-Aim moral ethology.” This approach is
essentially the exploration of the moral Umwelt of the animal. We turn now to the definition of
morality as used within this framework.

Morality Defined Within a 5th-Aim Ethology
Morality is seldom used in conjunction with animal behavior. Historically, humans have
been the only species assumed in mainstream biology and psychology to possess the type of
sentience capable of knowing or adhering to a moral standard.33 But as non-human animals have
increasingly demonstrated motivational and cognitive capacities once thought reserved for
humans,34 the assumption of human uniqueness in moral conduct has come under dispute.
Bekoff and Pierce have argued that morality should be a term added to the ethological lexicon.35
However, their use of morality is largely based upon the target species’ social norms and
expectations. Morality, for Bekoff and Pierce, is shared within a group. But using the 5th-Aim
ethological approach necessitates a distinction between this norm-based definition of morality
and the affective elements of that compose morality. In order to distinguish between these two
rival conceptions of morality, the shorthand Morality (Ethos) will be used to indicate the
individual’s subjectively-experienced moral character, whereas Morality (Culture) will be used to
designate the shared, socially-constructed, components of morality. And while Morality (Ethos)
and Morality (Culture) are significantly interrelated concepts, and both are necessary for
understanding morality in general, each has unique properties. Thus, it is crucial to maintain the
ability to differentiate between the two phenomena.

Bekoff, Marc, and Jessica Pierce (2009). Wild justice: The moral lives of animals. University of Chicago Press.
de Waal, Frans (2016). Are we smart enough to know how smart animals are? WW Norton & Company.
35
Bekoff, Marc, and Jessica Pierce (2009). Wild justice: The moral lives of animals. University of Chicago Press.
33
34
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In order to differentiate between these two concepts of morality, some examples from
human and animal moral experiences might prove helpful as a starting point. Morality (Ethos)
comprises the subjective feeling of injustice when one is cheated out of an expected reward. A
similar aversion to inequity, sometimes displayed in the form of angry protests, has also been
observed in capuchin monkeys. These monkeys will often cease exchanging tokens for a lesser
reward, such as a cucumber chip, if a neighboring conspecific receives a greater reward, like a
grape, for the same task.36 Morality (Culture) specifically defines the rules of justice within the
context of society, and the framework for correcting specific injustices, often through a thirdparty punishment system.37 Morality (Ethos) is also composed of the subjective compulsion,
experienced via empathic concern or in association with pair-bonding, to help the victims of
malice or unforeseeable accidents. Rhesus monkeys, for example, resist pulling levers that result
in pain for conspecifics.38 Rats proactively pull levers that relieve distress in conspecifics.39 40
Morality (Culture) describes expectations for which parties are most responsible for the care of
victims and the nature of that care. These expectations may be related to a role, such as that of
parent, or embedded within a species’ hierarchical structure – such as grooming behavior in
primates. In short, the focus of Morality (Ethos) is in satisfying of the subjective social emotions
and intuitions found in healthy social organisms. Morality (Culture) is the shared norms and
expectations for satisfying these social motivations and moral precepts. The relationship between

Brosnan, Sarah F., and Frans BM De Waal (2003). Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature, 425(6955), 297-299.
Jensen, Keith (2010). Punishment and spite, the dark side of cooperation. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 365(1553), 2635-2650.
38
Masserman, J. H., Wechkin, S. & Terris, W. (1964) "Altruistic" behavior in rhesus monkeys. American Journal of
Psychiatry, 121:584-585.
39
Rice, George E., and Priscilla Gainer (1962). ‘Altruism’ in the albino rat. Journal of comparative and
physiological psychology, 55(1), 123.
40
Bartal, I. B. A., Decety, J., & Mason, P. (2011). Empathy and pro-social behavior in rats. Science, 334(6061),
1427-1430.
36
37
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Morality (Ethos) and Morality (Culture) for the individual, using Von Uexküll’s model of the
Umwelt, is depicted in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1: (A.) Von Uexküll’s original conceptualization of the umwelt versus in relationship to external stimuli. 41
(B.) The relationship of Morality (Ethos) and Morality (cultural) within Von Uexküll’s model.

The set of social emotions which will receive the greatest attention in the dissertation are
related to pair-bonding. Pair-bonding, especially the bond between parent and offspring, and
mate pairs, is ubiquitous within most social species. Pair-bonding, as a component of Morality
(Ethos) has been proposed as the biological foundation of all cooperation-based moral systems. 42
As the attachment between parent and offspring became generalized to mates, kin, and other
conspecifics, a robust degree of altruism became possible.43 Panksepp, who has extensively
examined the emotional networks of social mammals, has proposed seven distinct primary neural
systems which provide the emotional drive to form lasting social bonds. Four of these systems
directly pertain to the hypotheses described in chapters two through four deserve to be

von Uexküll, Jakob (1992). A stroll through the worlds of animals and men: A picture book of invisible worlds.
Semiotica, 89(4), 319-391.
42
Singer, P. (2011). The expanding circle: Ethics, evolution, and moral progress. Princeton University Press.
43
Preston, Stephanie D. (2013). The origins of altruism in offspring care. Psychological bulletin, 139(6), 1305.
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highlighted here. A list of all Panksepp’s proposed systems is shown in Table 1.1.
The SEEKING system is connected to general motivation and appetitive behavior. It is
largely governed by the neurotransmitter dopamine extending to and from the ventral tegmental
area (VTA) and nucleus accumbens (NA). The CARE system, which is partially modulated by
the neuropeptide of oxytocin (OT) and vasopressin (VP) in mammals, promotes the “mother
love” of caregiving. The GRIEF/PANIC system, largely modulated by OT, prolactin, and
endogenous opioids, promotes the negative affect when these pair bonds are lost or threatened.
The FEAR system, largely modulated by the HPA and select nuclei in the amygdala, promote
freezing and hiding in response to a perceived threat. As applied to the morality system
described above, an individual may experience either high or low degrees of the “mother love,”
CARE-elicited emotions as part of their Morality (Ethos). But the expectations for social bondrelated behavior within a group would be contained in the Morality (Culture). For any given
individual, these two types of morality may be congruent or incongruent to any given context.

Twin Origins of the Two Moralities
The evolutionary relationship between these two types of morality is unavoidably
complex. In some ways a moral ethos can be viewed as a result of Natural Selection in that the
motivational networks underlying the ethos are assumed to have evolved via biological mutation
or genetic recombination in interaction with a developmental process, variation between
individuals, and a subsequent selection based upon their adaptive advantage. However, Morality
(Ethos) is not solely biological. In order to better explain the position Morality (Ethos) holds in
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Table 1.1: Panksepp’s primary emotional systems and their key neural mechanism (excluding the more recently
proposed SELF system).

SYSTEM

KEY BRAIN AREA

KEY NEUROTRANMITTERS

SEEKING

Nucleus accumbens - VTA,
Mesolimbic mesocortical outputs,
lateral hypothalamus – PAG,

DA, glutamate, other
neuropeptides, opioids, neurotensin

RAGE

Medial amygdala to BNST, Medial
and perifornical hypothalamus to
dorsal PAG

Substance P, Ach, Glutamate

FEAR

Central and lateral amygdala to
medial hypothalamus and dorsal
PAG

Glutamate, many neuropeptides,
DBI, CRF. CCK, alpha-MSH, NPY

LUST

Corticomedial amygdala, BNST,
Preoptic and ventromedial
hypothalamus, lateral and ventral
PAG

Steroids, vasopressin, oxytocin,
DBI, CRF, CCK alpha-HSH, NPY

CARE

Anterior cingulate, BNST, Preoptic
area, VTA, PAG

Oxytocin, Prolactin, DA, Opioids

PANIC

Anterior Cingulate, BNST, Preoptic
area, Dorsomedial thalamus,
Dorsal PAG

Opioids, Oxytocin, Prolactin, CRF,
glutamate

PLAY

Dorsomedial diencephalon,
parafascicular area, ventral PAG

Opioids, glutamate, ACH, any
agent evoking negative emotion
reduces play
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respect to Morality (Culture) within an evolutionary framework, we must begin with a basic
model of a moral phenotype.
Within the old debate concerning Nature versus Nurture, most Ethologists now agree that
organisms are actually a complex interaction between the forces of “Nature,” (biological), and
“Nurture,” (experiential or psychological), forces. To view any person as a collection of mere
biological mechanisms, without regard to the experiences of the person, or as a mere collection
of experiences, without regard to any biological mechanisms or processes, can only lead to a
distorted view of humans or other animals. In order to sufficiently describe an individual’s ethos,
we must view humans as an interaction between both biological and psychological influences. In
biology, the product of this interaction between inherited mechanisms and experiential factors is
called a phenotype. And this phenotype typically exhibits a certain array of phenotypic behavior,
including communicatory acts, that are influenced by these biological mechanisms and learning
experiences. This, hopefully uncontroversial, model of human phenotype is summarized in
Figure 1.2.
Since Morality (Ethos) has its essence derived from both its neural circuity and own
experiences, it is significantly influenced by natural selection and cultural transmission.44 Given
the complexity of a gene, and the potential variation in experiences, when the principle of dual
origin is applied to any species, a great deal of variation is possible. On one hand, gene
polymorphisms, epigenetics, in utero nutritional availability, hormone exposure, and the presence
or absence of teratogens could have significant consequences for the neural circuitry underlying

Richerson, P. J., & Boyd, R. (2005). Not by genes alone: How culture transformed human evolution. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
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Figure 1.2: A depiction of the relationship between genotype, phenotype, and proximate factors influencing
behavior— with a focus on communication.45

Burghardt GM. (1977) The ontogeny of communication. In: Sebeok TA, editor. How Animals Communicate.
Bloomington, Ind, USA: Indiana University Press; pp. 67–93
45
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the moral sentiments of a given phenotype. Just as with individual animals one phenotype may
be more biologically prone for displays of empathy or less sensitive to detecting injustice than
another. 46
Conversely, the nature of offspring care, the norms of Morality (Culture), and many other
motivational factors could have a significant impact on how the moral precepts are expressed,
applied, and the relative importance assigned to each motivation in a particular context. An
organism’s biological predisposition toward sympathy or sensitivity to injustice may receive
significant approval (reward) or censure (punishment) from their social environment and
subsequently decrease or increase the innate strength of these sentiments. Thus, Morality (Ethos)
is driven both by the biological forces of natural selection and genetic drift as well as the
transmission of the rules or norms found in Morality (Culture). Or, more succinctly, Morality
(Ethos) is the “motivational bridge” between the neurology and the subjective experience of an
individual. It comprises the deepest social emotions found within a species. Morality (Culture)
is the shared moral norms of a group. An extension of the Von Uexküll Umwelt model to
incorporate multiple, interacting individuals is depicted in Figure 1.3.
Often the norms and expectations of the Morality (Culture) are often communicated
through cues and signals between individuals. The use of cues and signals to communicate moral
expectations to conspecifics will receive greater attention in the next chapter. However, at this
point it is important to point out that the morality-related signals sent or received by the
individual can be used for variety of purposes. They can be used to indicate cooperative or

Richerson, P., Baldini, R., Bell, A. V., Demps, K., Frost, K., Hillis, V., & Ross, C. (2016). Cultural group selection
follows Darwin's classic syllogism for the operation of selection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39.
46
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Figure 1.3: Interacting Morality (Ethos) forming a Morality (Culture) Matrix.
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hostile intentions. A dog may bare its teeth at a stranger or use a play bow to initiate play with a
litter mate. These signals may be honest signaling or deceptions. The signals may be effected by
social roles or place on a dominance hierarchy. There is a tremendous amount of potential for
diversity in moral-related communication47 which is required in order to maintain even a
relatively simple Morality (Culture) system.
Many possibilities arise when a focus is placed upon behavioral interactions between
moral phenotypes. There may be only one optimal Morality (Ethos) for all members of a species,
or there may be a diverse set of interacting moral characters that are the most advantageous.
Moral phenotypes that are advantageous under one set of conditions, such as resource scarcity,
might not be advantageous other conditions, such as resource abundance. Despite these
possibilities, the Morality (Ethos) of the individual remains the foundation of cultural morality.
And this ethos is greatly influenced both by the forces of natural selection and cultural selection.
An ethos in early development would be heavily influenced by the Morality (Culture)
surrounding it. Then, as the organism develops, it would, in most cases, increasingly influence
the shared Morality (Culture) of which it was part.

A Tension between the Moralities
The separation of morality into two components, ethos and culture, raises an important
paradox concerning natural selection: Is it the ethos-based morality that is selected for or against
in nature and the culture-based morality that is derivative, or vice versa? The answer to this

Krams, I., Krama, T., Freeberg, T. M., Kullberg, C., & Lucas, J. R. (2012). Linking social complexity and vocal
complexity: a parid perspective. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B, 367(1597), 1879-1891.
47
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paradox has been addressed by the Wilson & Wilson in multilevel selection theory.48 49 One of
the central components of multi-level selection is that certain traits can evolve in an individual
despite being locally disadvantageous to the organism. This can occur when advantages of
membership in a group outweigh the fitness burden of the locally disadvantageous traits to the
individual over the long term. When this type of selection of multiple traits is successful, a
“superorganism” can form. Wilson and Wilson point out that evolutionary biology has many
examples of superorganism emergence.50 They argue that many multicellular organisms are a
product of cooperative single cells. Many genetic and developmental phenomena such as
“chromosomes, the rules of meiosis, a cell stage in the life cycle, the early sequestration of the
germ line, and programmed death of cell lineages” are examples of superorganism principles
suppressing the primacy of the individual elements that constitute an organism. 51
These multi-level selection principles, applied to morality, suggest that morally-related
emotion in one’s ethos can be locally disadvantageous to an individual, at least in some
instances, as long as there are greater advantages to the individual as a member within the larger
group. Thus, an organism can theoretically possess a moral ethos which contains elements that
conflict with individual fitness advantages, provided that they are compensated for by the fitness
advantages of Morality (Culture). However, it is probable that the relatively rapid process of
cultural transmission would promote much greater variability in any particular generation in
moral behavior than the (typically) much slower process of natural selection. With respect to

Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1999). Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish behavior (No. 218).
Harvard University Press
49
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Quarterly Review of Biology, 82(4), 327-348.
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natural selection, we would anticipate selection for moral flexibility in response to a changing
Morality (Culture). This type of phenotypic flexibility was previously predicted in what is known
as the Baldwin Effect.52 53As applied to morality, we would anticipate flexibility in response to a
dynamic morality (Culture) to be more advantageous than a rigid and unchanging ethos
incapable of adapting to the rapid changes of culture.
The group can be defined in numerous ways. We assume that families, tribes,
communities, corporations, organizations, and nations all compose types of societies that may
provide advantages to an individual. And we would expect that differences between these groups
would draw upon the Morality (Ethos) in different ways. One’s own family, supported by all the
impetus of kin selection and inclusive fitness,54 would likely result in an increased demand on
many of the individual’s moral sentiments compared to a more tangential relationship. When
dealing with individuals from an out-group, or where the advantages of group membership are
small, we would expect smaller demands on the locally disadvantageous moral motivations.
These various expectations, found in the form of rules, laws, policies, and etiquette of humans,
form the vast and complex set of moral behavior and expectations notated as Morality (Culture).
And though no human groups meet the criteria of interconnectedness of a “superorganism,”
prehistoric tribes or a nuclear family would be much closer to this superorganism state, than, say,
a nation.
Two important features of morality require emphasis. First, the group-level, Morality

Baldwin, J. Mark (1896). A new factor in evolution. The American Naturalist, 30(354), 441-451.
Badyaev, A. V. (2009). Evolutionary significance of phenotypic accommodation in novel environments: an
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(Culture) is based upon the individual Morality (Ethos); much like organs are comprised of sets
of cells, systems compose sets of organs, and organisms compose sets of systems. Each
individual Ethos, as mentioned earlier, may vary in some respects. However, the ethos of each
individual composing a group cannot be incompatible to each other with without diminishing, or
eliminating, the overall group fitness – just as an organism’s glands cannot produce massive
amounts of substances that are unfilterable and toxic to their central nervous system and remain
viable.
The second important feature of Morality (Culture) is competition. Groups and their Morality
(Culture) can exist in a network which is in competition for various types of resources with other
groups as depicted in Figure 1.4. Thus, a Morality (Culture) which is composed of incompatible,
inter-competing, and segregated set of Morality (Ethos) phenotypes are less likely to successfully
compete against Morality (Culture) composed of a compatible, cooperating, and integrated set of
Morality (Ethos) phenotypes. We thus arrive at the arch-principle of multilevel selection theory:
individual altruism “wins” between groups, individual selfishness “wins” within the group. So
which came first, the ethos or the culture? The answer from a Multi-level Selection perspective is
that they evolved as sometimes cooperating, at other times competing, twins.

Searching for Moral Fundamentals
This complex picture of Morality (Culture) becomes much more complicated as we move
from the individual and their ethos and the Morality (Culture) of their group membership, into a
model incorporating multiple group memberships. It is here that humans and animals differ
significantly. Humans are often simultaneously members of many groups. Many of these groups
exist by voluntary membership, such as a modern place of employment, while membership
23

Figure 1.4: As simplified version of the exponential complexity that can occur as various groups of Morality
(Culture) interact within a social network.
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in other groups is not a product of choice, such as the biological family. As the number of these
group memberships increase they can create interlocking, possibly competing, layers of Morality
(Culture), which presents substantial challenges in the study of human morality. Humans are
quite unique in the type, complexity of, and number of, groups in which they are members.
Compared to humans most other species, as far as we can observe, possess membership in few
other groups. They might be part of a mate pair, a family, or a flock or band. Few other species
have frequent contact with other groups, or those outside their flock or band, which result in
sustained, coordinated, and cooperative behavior. This may be due to the cognitive limitations of
these various species or a more a fundamental set of biological constraints of nature. But
whatever the reasons may be for the complexity of human social systems, the search for
fundamental set moral motivations would be greatly enhanced by the examination of the moral
motivations experienced by animals living in a simpler social context, in short — a comparative
species approach to morality.

25

CHAPTER 2: AVIAN MORAL MOTIVATION
Rationale and Hypothesis Generation

“The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable—namely, that any animal
whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being
here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual
powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man. For, firstly, the social
instincts lead an animal to take pleasure in the society of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of
sympathy with them, and to perform various services for them.”55

Darwin argued that any animal species would inevitably develop a moral conscience once
that species had obtained certain social and intellectual prerequisites via natural selection. He
emphasized parental and affiliation-based social instincts and certain “intellectual powers” as the
foundation for this moral conscience.56 Thus, according to Darwin, one would not expect to find
expressions of sympathy, helping behavior, or the pleasure in affiliating others, in completely
solitary animals – or in animals that did not care for their own offspring. The care of offspring
then, according to Darwin, is central to the probable evolutionary path of morality. Applying
Darwin’s argument to the two types of morality presented in chapter one, we would expect that
morality has a basis in parental and filial affections, or what we would call offspring care, in the
Morality (ethos) and some intellectual powers that allow for the moral interaction of culture.

55
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Avian “Parental and Filial Affections”
Many avian species appear to possess these “well-marked” parental instincts, which
Darwin suggested were fundamental to prosocial motivation. Many birds care for their
offspring,57 indicating they possess these strong parental and filial instincts. Female chickens,
which also use food-related calls, show physiological changes—like an increased heart rate—and
vocalize more when their chicks are distressed.58 This suggests that chickens possess a
rudimentary capacity to detect distress in others and that this perceived distressed state alters
their own affective state—a behavior that fits within Darwin’s statement of “a certain amount of
sympathy.” And these “affections” do not appear isolated to offspring. The heartrate of geese
elevated when their mate enters a fight.59 Social monogamy is more common in birds than
mammals.60 This widespread monogamy suggests that there is a greater percentage of birds than
mammals that have extended these strong pair bonds beyond their offspring to their mates. And
beyond Darwin, these findings are consistent with several models that propose that altruistic
behavior evolved as an extension of parental care and pair bonding.61 62
Carolina chickadees have also been shown to invest a significant amount of time into the
care of their mates and offspring. Male chickadees have been observed feeding their mates just
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prior to copulation and continue to return to the nest during the incubation period (at a rate of 2.2
visits per hour) to provide food for their mate. 63 64 Female chickadees invest the majority of their
time (approximately 77.2% of daylight hours) attending to their active nests.65 Parental care by
both parents continues throughout incubation and hatchling phases. Both the female and the
hatchlings may be fed exclusively by the male in the first few days after the hatching process
begins. This offspring care extends past the fledging period as parents escort the fledged birds to
the edge, or out of, their territory. During this period, vocalizations from both parents are
common.66 67
In the previous chapter we described moral character, or Morality (Ethos), as a set of
subjectively experienced moral motivations. Using Darwin’s proposition that “parental and filial
affections” form the basis for helping, sympathy, and presumably other positive forms of moral
behavior, we can begin to develop this model with the first potential motivational prerequisite of
a moral ethos, or character. This rudimentary moral emotion, using Darwin’s words, is affection.
The examples of chickadee parental and mate care-giving provide evidence that Carolina
chickadees meet the basic motivational criterion of affection. Using the Panksepp model of
social emotions, this type of affection best fits within his description of the CARE system. The
CARE system is described as the source of nurturance, or in the vernacular, “mother love.”
However, it is important to note that Panksepp’s emotional model is focused on
emotional commonalities within mammalian, not avian, species. An avian species, such as a
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Carolina chickadee, can provide some examples of similarity between their CARE system and
the CARE system common amongst mammals. Some of these similarities, such as the parental
investment highlighted above, or the neurological similarities summarized below, suggest a
similar functional and motivational capacity for CARE. However, there are also likely to be
many examples in which these systems differ, at least, in mechanism. For this reason it is
important to emphasize that the CARE system of the chickadee, abbreviated as CAREchickadee, is essentially a homeologue,68 not necessarily a homologue, of the mammalian CARE
system. The goal here is to identify motivational correlates, not to assume interchangeable
subjective experiences between avian and mammalian species.
One of the chief obstacles in comparing these Pankseppian emotional systems is that—
relative to what is known about mammalian motivational neurology—much less is known about
their avian homeologues. Avian brains have many unique neurological features in comparison to
many mammalian brains, such differences as overall brain size, grey to white matter ratios, and
the nature of seasonal endocrine changes. However, there is also some evidence that avian
brains possess areas analogous to a human cortex.69 The avian homologues of oxytocin and
vasopressin, mesotocin and vasotocin, may modulate affiliative behavior in birds in ways similar
to mammals.70 Thus, while the neuroanatomy of avian social motivation remains significantly
less developed than the neuroanatomy of mammalian social motivation, from the evidence that
does exist, there appear to be at least some parallels between a mammalian and an avian social
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motivation for Darwin’s parental and filial affections. It should be emphasized that the
differences between the neural correlates of the CARE system also suggest some difference in
the CARE-related emotion experienced by birds and mammals. However, these systems can also
be assumed to have a least one important commonality. Any CARE-based emotion, whether
avian or mammalian, by definition must have a positive emotional valence that can become
associated with another organism. Without this positive affect, and an object for this positive
affect, a CARE-based emotion would lose its functional purpose. It would cease to describe a
CARE system.
Despite the issues that surround comparative neuroanatomy and the many possibilities for
divergence in subjective experience, from a 5th-Aim perspective it is a relatively safe assumption
that Carolina chickadees possess a strong capacity for experiencing positive emotion in
connection to their mates and offspring. As a result of this motivational capacity, both male and
female chickadees can invest significantly into helping behavior. Given the presence of these
extensive and costly parental investments, objections to the idea that Carolina chickadees are
capable of exhibiting some form of morality system is likely to be based more on a lack of what
Darwin referred as the “intellectual powers” than any deficiency in the “parental and filial
instincts”.

Avian “Intellectual Powers”
What are the “intellectual powers,” or cognitive capacities, which combine with these
filial instincts to create what Darwin called a “moral conscience”? Darwin held that these
capacities should be, at least in some ways, humanlike. The inclusion of humans as the standard
for morality-generating intellectual capacity begs at least one important question. Which of
30

mankind’s intellectual powers was Darwin speaking to? The capacity to learn, to detect the
motivations of others, to solve complex problems using abstract symbol-based reasoning, or to
formulate the probabilities of future events? All of the capacities are examples of “intellectual
powers” possessed by at least some humans. Which of these, if any, is the foundation of this
moral conscience? It is unlikely that Darwin believed all of these particular human capabilities
were required. If this were true, it would reduce Darwin’s proposition to an empty tautology. We
would be forced to read Darwin to mean that any being with all of humanities’ instincts and
intellectual characteristics would probably behave much like a human. This is true, of course, but
not worth writing.
This motivational model used in this dissertation assumes another possibility. If we
remove humans as the standard of intellectual comparison, and take a comparative cognition
approach, we can envision a continuum of cognitive capacities playing an important role in the
moral ethos of a species or individual. If we start by incorporating this continuum, we need not
assume that the cognitive “prerequisites” for morality require complex perspective-taking
capacities such as a Theory of the Mind (ToM).71 Higher-order intelligence can promote a
“common good” morality or self-interest.72 And as de Waal has observed, conceptualizing
morality as the exclusive or primary domain of higher-order cognition is a post-Kantian idea.73
Simply framed, the model used in this dissertation views the Morality (Ethos) and Morality
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(Culture) both as existing on a continuum of complexity.74 The more complexity in the emotional
system possessed by the individual or a species, the greater the potential for complexity within
the corresponding Morality (Ethos). The more complex the cognitive and communicative
capacity is in the individual or species, the greater the potential for complexity in the combined
Morality (Culture). This relationship between cognitive and communicative complexity, moral
motivation, and the potential for Morality (Culture) complexity is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The
connection between cognitive and communicative capacity is outlined below. However, first we
examine a few fundamental “intellectual powers” that may underlie a rudimentary morality.
Individual Recognition and Image Scoring
One of the most important cognitive requirements we might assume to exist in a species
with a moral system is the ability to discriminate between conspecifics. The ability of a
chickadee, or any other species, to distinguish between males and females has obvious fitness
advantages, at least during the mating season. The ability to distinguish flock mates from rival
groups also has obvious fitness advantages in some domains such as food recruitment. Many bird
species have been shown to distinguish between genetically-related individuals and non-related
individuals. This suggest the possibly of a kin selection evolutionary driver for this ability to
discriminate between conspecifics. Black-capped chickadees (Poecile atricapillus) possess the
ability to discriminate between conspecifics using only auditory cues. Many parid species,
including chickadees, also have well-established dominance hierarchies which suggest the ability

Complexity is defined here as being composed of additional components or possible states as opposed to few
components or possible states.
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Figure 2.1: The complexity of a moral system can summarized as a product of Ethos complexity X
Cognitive/Communicative complexity.
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to recognize and store information for conspecifics. Thus, many avian species, including
chickadees, appear to possess a highly developed ability to discriminate between the identities of
other individuals.
Another cognitive ability that might be central to a cooperative motivational system is the
ability to recognize, evaluate, and remember motivational or reputational information about
others—known as image scoring. Image scoring involves an evaluation of other organisms and
can be seen as fundamental component of reputation systems.75 It does not appear that robust
cognitive capacities are required to maintain a simple form of an image score. The ability to track
behavioral information about others seems to be present in reef fish as they select more helpful
cleaner fish to aid in parasite removal.76 An avian study of pied flycatchers (Ficedula hypoleuca)
found that when neighboring birds arrived to help mob an owl model, those neighbors were more
likely to receive mobbing assistance when their nests were threatened.77 This study also suggests,
at the very least, an ability to maintain an image score of other conspecifics; and may indicate an
ability to participate in a reciprocity-based defense system. Another study with Eurasian jays
(Cyanistes caeruleus) suggested that some birds have the capacity to make social decisions based
on the perceived hedonic value of a food to their partner versus their own food preferences. In
this study, male jays fed the female jays a greater proportion of the type of food that had been
withheld from the females’ diet. The males only showed this behavior when they were able to
witness their mate’s food availability.78 This study suggests, not only an ability of some avian
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species to track information related to a conspecific, but also an ability to attach specific
motivational information to the image score.
Social Learning
Another cognitive ability we might expect in any species capable of sustainable
cooperative behavior is the ability to observe and then to perform the activities of conspecifics –
a process generally referred to as social learning. Perhaps the most famous example of social
learning was the rapid proliferation of milk bottle opening behavior documented in British tits
(Parus major).79 Sherry and Galef demonstrated a similar adaptation in Black-capped chickadees
but they suggested that imitation may not be the primary vehicle for this the proliferation of
behavior.80 81 They proposed that the exposure of the desirable stimuli was the key factor in the
proliferation of this behavior and modeling behavior. Aplin et al, studying wild-caught blue tits
(Cyanistes caeruleus), came to the opposite conclusion. 82 They found that not only the result,
but the technique the birds used to manipulate objects was proliferated in the population. The
disparity between the results found in the Sherry& Galef 83 and Aplin et al84 studies could be
resolved in a number of different ways. But with either of these interpretations, it is clear that the
foraging success of one bird can become transferrable to conspecifics in multiple species.
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Social learning is also well documented in avian signaling. Juvenile rehearsal of
vocalizations has been demonstrated in multiple species including cowbirds (Monothrus ater),85
sparrows (Zonotrichia leucophrys),86 and zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata).87 Both blackcapped chickadees and Carolina chickadees are exposed to the calls of their parents throughout
their incubation, hatchling, fledging, and post-fledging periods. The use of general call appears
as early as 10 days after hatching.88 Thus, we can say with a high degree of confidence, that
during the short infancy and adolescence of chickadees, a rapid period of biological development
and social demonstration interact to create the rudiments of the chickadee call system.

Emotional Signaling
Up to this point we have discussed a definition of morality as consisting of two parts – an
ethos, and set of shared cultural norms. We have also argued that morality can be viewed as
existing on a continuum of complexity versus existing as categorical phenomenon only
experienced in species with a complex set of cognitions. One of the important features of this
two-part morality that has yet to be discussed directly is communication. Communication is an
essential element of morality connecting the subjective Morality (Ethos) with the shared
Morality (Cultural) of the group. Within this dual morality model, there is not a categorical
difference between moral and non-moral communication. However, some signals and some
signalers would be expected to possess a larger impact on the Morality (Culture) than others.

West, M. J., & King, A. P. (1985). Social guidance of vocal learning by female cowbirds: validating its functional
significance. Ethology, 70(3), 225-235.
86
Marler, P., & Peters, S. (1982). Subsong and plastic song: their role in the vocal learning process. Acoustic
communication in birds, 2, 25-50.
87
Johnson, F., Soderstrom, K., & Whitney, O. (2002). Quantifying song bout production during zebra finch sensorymotor learning suggests a sensitive period for vocal practice. Behavioural brain research, 131(1), 57-65.
88
Brewer, R. (1961). Comparative notes on the life history of the Carolina Chickadee. The Wilson Bulletin, 348-373.
85

36

Morality (Culture) is related to norms and expectations. Signalers higher on a dominance
hierarchy would be expected, in many instances, to have greater influence on the Morality
(Culture), perhaps through the enforcement of norms or even norm creation, than more
subordinate members of a group. A signal bearing little relationship to the group’s norms and
expectations would only be tangentially connected to morality. Thus, communicating
environmental information, such as the presence of a food source becomes moral signaling when
there is a corresponding expectation to communicate that information. Evidence of these
expectations would come in the form of either punishing behavior from the group, such as
exclusion or agonism, or rewarding behavior, such as enhanced reputation or increased mating
opportunities. 89
The type of communication being investigated as a part of this dissertation is foodassociated calls made by the Carolina chickadee. Chickadees possess a complex and versatile
vocal communication system, making them an excellent target species for investigating the
motivational aspects of signaling. Chickadees often use a chick-a-dee call,90 91 hereafter
referred to as the “general call,” consisting of multiple note types.92 93A-notes and B-notes are
high frequency notes that usually precede the more broadband C-notes and D-notes. The acoustic
characteristics of these broadband C-notes and D-notes make their source easier to locate by
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conspecifics or predators.94 95Thus, the use of C-notes and D-notes in calls may function to
recruit individuals to the location of the signaler. C-notes have been associated with flight.96 97
The D-notes have been observed in multiple contexts including predator contexts98 or food
recruitment.99 The general call of the Carolina chickadee, especially the D-notes embedded in
these calls, are the focal communication investigated in this dissertation.

Animal food signaling: The motivational question
In order to test our hypothesis that some avian species possess both the motivational
capacity and the rudimentary cognitive abilities (in the form of image scoring, individual
recognition, and social learning) to form a moral ethos, we must find an appropriate behavior as
a basis for investigation. The target behavior in the study of cooperation should be an instance of
helping.100 If the cooperative behavior involves mobbing or other forms of aggression, it is
unlikely that the motivational states preceding the behavior stem from the “parental and filial
affections” proposed by Darwin. One type of behavior that potentially meets the requirements of
this affiliation-based test is food sharing.
There are many species that communicate the availability of food to conspecifics. Some

Wiley RH, Richards DG. (1982). Adaptations for acoustic communication in birds: sound transmission and signal
design. In: Kroodsma DE, Miller EH, Ouellet H, editors. Acoustic communication in birds. New York: Academic
Press. p. 131–181.
95
Bradbury JW, Vehrencamp SL. (1998). Principles of animal communication. Sunderland (MA): Sinauer.
96
Mahurin, E. J., Freeberg, T.M. (2009) Chick-a-dee call variation in Carolina chickadees and recruiting flockmates
to food. Behav Ecol 20:111–116
97
Freeberg TM, Lucas JR. (2002). Receivers respond differently to chick-a-dee calls varying in note composition in
Carolina chickadees, Poecile carolinensis. Anim Behav. 63:837–845.
98
Bloomfield LL, Phillmore LS, Weisman RG, Sturdy CB. (2005). Note types and coding in parid vocalizations III:
The chick-a-dee call of the Carolina chickadee (Poecile carolinensis). Can J Zool. 83:820–833.
99
Clemmons, J., & Howitz, J. L. (1990). Development of early vocalizations and the chick-a-dee call in the blackcapped chickadee, Parus atricapillus. Ethology, 86(3), 203-223
100
de Waal, Frans BM. (2008). Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: The Evolution of Empathy. Annu. Rev.
Psychol., 59, 279–300.
94

38

primates, which we assume to possess a relatively high degree of cognitive complexity, may be
quite sensitive to the presence of conspecifics when signaling about food availability – known as
an audience effect. During one field study, researchers played chimpanzee (P. troglodytes) “pant
hoots” from a member of the same band as they approached a conspecific at a food source.101
The researchers then observed if the food-finding chimpanzee returned the call with a “rough
grunt” – a vocalization associated with food discovery. Their subsequent analysis indicated that
chimpanzees are more likely to call to more dominant “friends” in this exchange. This same
research group was able to build upon these findings when examining alarm calls in response to
model snakes. They found evidence in their analysis that these calls were a) socially directed and
given to the arrival of friends, b) linked with gaze monitors and alternations, and c) goal directed,
since the calls ceased once recipients were safe from the predator.102 Chimpanzees also are more
likely to recruit conspecifics for tasks when they had a history of successfully cooperating with
them.103 Thus, it appears quite likely that some non-human primates have an incredibly complex
and robust (often food-related) reciprocity system.
Food sharing appears to be quite common in non-primates as well. Honeybees (Apis
Linnaeus) relay food location through their dance patterns,104 an intriguing discovery that led to a
Nobel Prize. Food-related signaling exists in species as diverse as ants (Leptothorax),105 dolphins
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(Tursiops truncates),106 and ravens (Corvus corax).107 How these other species communicate the
food location may differ in mode—such as odor trails in mole rats (Heterocephalus glaber),108
movement patterns such in bees,109 or vocalizations in primates110—but it is generally accepted
that many animals communicate the location of food to conspecifics. What is not generally
agreed upon is the set of motivations that compel this signaling. Functional explanations for
behavior are not the same as motivational explanations for behavior.111 The motivational reason
why any animals (both primates and non-primates) are motivated to reveal food locations to
conspecifics, instead of merely consuming the food, remains an important question in animal
psychology.

Two Hypotheses
Given the immense complexity inherent in any moral system, and the goal of discovering
the fundamental motivational components that compose that system, a comparative approach
might prove beneficial. An ideal biological system or species for studying a multi-level morality
would, ideally, be as simple as possible while still containing many of the same elements of the
human variety of morality. This target species should possess some set of social motivations,
such as the Darwin’s “filial affections” found in Panksepp’s CARE system, and at least in some
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basic “intellectual powers” that allow for sustained cooperative behavior between conspecifics.
One species that might meet this criterion of affection, basic cognitions, and simplicity is the
Carolina chickadee, Poecile carolinensis.
M.S. Ficken observed that black-capped chickadees, a close relative of the Carolina
chickadee, often emit calls upon the discovery of a new food source. She suggested that this
type of food-related communication might qualify as altruism.112 That is, the chickadees were
believed to incur a fitness cost in the recruiting of flock-mates to, and the sharing of, a food
source in order to convey the benefit of the available food to conspecifics. However, this
interpretation has not been universally accepted. Several alternative explanations for this calling
behavior have been proposed, including various ‘predation-defense’ hypotheses. Since the focus
of this dissertation is on the subjective motivations of the ethos, we will need to translate these
functional or phylogenetic hypotheses into motivational hypotheses. The act of behavior-toemotion translation, whether across languages or time periods, can hold many perils. We must
always be willing to revise our translations as new information arises. Thus, these translations
should be viewed as tentative. We begin our translation process with the “predation defense”
hypothesis.
The Predator Defense → FEAR Hypothesis
The predator defense theories attempt to explain flock recruitment to a food source by
highlighting the advantage of having additional conspecifics in the area. These added
conspecifics function to decrease the probability that the calling bird will fall victim to predation.
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The vocalizing birds may be attempting to dilute predator risk by recruiting more potential
predator targets to the foraging area. Or, the callers may be attempting to recruit other birds to
the food source in order to increase the amount of predator surveillance present. A partial
summary of some of these predator-defense hypotheses are included in Table 2.1. In light of
these predator defense explanations, the claim that this food-related calling was cooperative or
altruistic was often met with serious skepticism. Most of these predator defense hypotheses
assume a non-altruistic motivation behind the calling behavior. One literature review went so far
as to state that there is no evidence of reciprocal altruism among avian species.113
Translating the predation defense hypothesis to motivational language, the best
homeological fit into a Pankseppian formulation is a motivation of FEAR-Avian. Whether or not
the food-associated vocalizations become associated with FEAR via genetically-based
neurological connectivity, or this connectivity is acquired through experience in not here
explored. What we are exploring is that the subjective experience of the bird immediately
preceding the food-associated calls is a negatively-valenced emotion; and that this emotion is
experienced in response to the perception of increased danger.
One of the most commonly cited studies used to support the predator defense theory is
Elgar’s house sparrow (Passer domesticus) study. In this series of experiments the researcher
altered the distance a) between himself and the feeding apparatus and b) between a common
perch and the feeding apparatus. Elgar found a decrease in chirrup calls—associated with food
resources—when the feeding apparatus was farther away from him, but nearer to the common
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Table 2.1: A summary of “Predator Defense” hypotheses adapted from Sridhar et al., 2009.114
Effect

Effect Description

Source

Herd Effect

reduced risk in relation to the position of group members

Hamilton 1971

Dilution Effect

reduced probability of targeting by a predator

Foster & Treherne
1981

Encounter Effect

reduced probability of being encountered by a predator

Inman & Krebs 1987

Confusion Effect

reduced ability of a predator to single out individual prey

Neill & Cullen 1974

Many-eyes Effect

increased probability of a predator being detected

Pulliam 1973

Disturbance

physical disturbance of predators by many birds

Charnov & Krebs 1975
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perching area. He interpreted this finding to suggest the perceived increase in threat, caused by
his own proximity to the feeding station, resulted in more recruitment calling. A FEAR-based
interpretation is quite consistent with this finding; as predation-stimulated FEAR increases, so
does the amount of sparrow vocalizations.
Comparative analysis between phylogenetically-related mainland and island species has
also been used to support a predator defense model for food recruitment. For example,
Beauchamp proposed that when predation pressure becomes relaxed on isolated islands, flocking
decreases compared to related mainland species.115 Using the adapted Pankseppian model for
these findings we again find that FEAR-Avian would be a consistent motivation with the
inducement of flocking behavior and conspecific recruitment.
Some of the neurological correlates of a FEAR-Avian system have been documented in a
variety of species. Similar to a mammalian fight-or-flight system,116 birds have a stress response
system modulated largely by a HPA (Hypothalamus-Pituitary-Adrenal) axis. Endocrine changes,
such as elevations in Corticosterone or ACTH can occur in response to stressful stimuli or alter
the behavior response to stimuli. Alaskan redpolls (Acanthis flammea), for example show
elevations in glucocorticoid level after an hour in captivity,117 just as many mammalian species
do. And white-crowned sparrows (Zonotrichia. leucophrys oriantha) treated with corticosterone
more readily relocated from high-elevation breeding grounds to the warmth of lower
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elevations.118 However, there are also some differences in how the HPA axis is utilized in avian
and mammalian species. Avian species can exhibit stronger seasonal fluctuations in their stressrelated endocrine systems that interact with social status and other factors, which also influence
mammalian hormones.119 But these differences aside, from a 5th-Aim perspective, it is highly
probable that the majority of avian species possess a FEAR homeologue experienced as a
negatively-valenced emotion in response to threat.
The Homeostatic → SEEKING Hypothesis
There are some data that suggest that food-associated vocalizations may not be motivated
by FEAR-based emotion. In the previously described house sparrow study, the raw data show,
counterintuitively, that the second fewest number of calls occurred when the feeder was closer to
the observer and farthest away from the perch.120 If the motivational cause of the chirrup calls
was FEAR—evoked by the perception of an increased predation risk (via the nearby observer)—
the far away perch condition might have been expected to generate the most perceived threat and
the highest rate of chirrup calling. And one of the least emphasized aspects of the Elgar studies is
the effect of temperature on chirrup call rate. Elgar noted this confound and found a significant
negative correlation between calling rates and temperature—above and beyond the effects of the
experimental manipulations. What is not apparent is if the effects of experimental design would
still be significant if the effects of site temperature had been removed from analysis. Thus, it
would appear that measurement of the temperature of the feeding sites during foraging
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experiments is crucial for identifying the motivation associated with this calling phenomenon.
In light of these problems connected with a FEAR-based motivational explanation for
food-associated calls, another hypothesis is warranted. One possibility that has received much
less examination is that the signaler’s own homeostatic energy regulation system might play a
role in modulating food-associated calls.121 Homeostatic drives are closely related to the
Panksepps’ SEEKING-Avian system. The SEEKING system is related to general motivation and
associated with approach or appetitive states of an animal. States of food deprivation
unconditionally arouse the SEEKING-Avian system.122 Just as with Skinner’s superstitious
pigeons,123 food-associated calls may be related to an appetitive motivation. In humans we call
this appetitive motivation hunger. Our hypothesis here is that SEEKING-related motivation
maybe a strong proximate emotion influencing the food-associated call.
There are several studies that suggest the possibility of a SEEKING basis for foodassociated calling. The first string of evidence comes from the required energetic intake over the
winter for non-migratory birds.124 The need for constant food intake is significant. At 23°C the
night-time weight losses are equivalent to between 2.7 and 3.9 kcal/g in typical birds, depending
on activity level. These energetic demands increase sharply in the sub-freezing conditions
common for chickadees during the winter. A study that examined energy expenditure in the
Carolina chickadee, the focal species of this study, found chickadees used 42% more energy per
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day during nonbreeding season than during breeding season.125 During winter black-capped
chickadees three times their basal rate of expenditure during the winter.126 Black-capped
chickadees appear to disband their mixed flocks when temperature rises above 25◦ C.127 Similar
to Beauchamp’s argument that predation pressure is related to flocking behavior, temperature,
and the associated energetic demands, are also potential pressure influencing flocking behavior.
Some species display temperature-dependent calling behavior. Cliff swallows
(Petrochelidon pyrrhonota) often use a squeak call that attracts conspecifics to the foraging
site.128 After flushing insects from the provisioning site, the researchers observed increases in
squeak calls from the swallows. The authors suggested that the added conspecifics may function
to help track the insect swarms. But this effect was only observed when temperatures were below
17◦ C. It is not immediately clear why the advantage of extra insect-tracking help would dissipate
under a given temperature. Another study designed specifically to address the predator defense
versus a homeostatic-based, foraging efficiency hypothesis, by altering food supplementation,
suggested predation defense alone cannot account for the changes in flocking that occur near a
food source.129 Grubb concluded that a type of foraging efficiency must play a role in this
flocking behavior.
Evidence linking food-associated calls and homeostatic motivation has also been
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documented in Carolina chickadees. A captive study using Carolina chickadees revealed an
association between an increase in non-song vocalizations to less food availability and lower
body density.130 The chickadee general call, especially the number of D-notes used in the call,
has been associated with food discovery.131 These experiments suggest that embedded within
these calls is information used by the receivers to locate potential food sources. They also found
that signalers produced more D-notes in their calls when they were the first bird to arrive and
before the second chickadee arrived, compared to calls produced after the second chickadee
arrived. This pattern suggests a recruiting function. There was also a shorter latency for receivers
to approach a novel food source when recorded calls with 7-11 “D” notes were played than
recordings with 2-5 “D” notes.132 The calls may or may not be functionally referential (specific)
to food stimuli. The calls may be general calls to approach the signaler or they may be mere
indications of positive affective state. The important aspect of these D-note laden calls is that
they function as a recruitment call for flock-mates. A follow-up study replicated these findings
and suggested that it was not the total number of notes, but the relative frequency of these calls,
or duty cycle, that is the primary structural component that attracts conspecifics to a feeding
site.133
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Hypotheses Summarized
We can now summarize the motivational hypotheses that will be tested in the experiments
described in chapters three and four. The first set of hypothesis is the FEAR-based hypothesis for
the general call of the chickadee. This hypothesis proposes that a negatively-valenced, FEAR
homeologue is the proximate emotion promoting the food-associated calls in the Carolina
chickadee. The second hypothesis is that a positively-valenced SEEKING homeologue is the
proximate emotion promoting the food–associated call in the Carolina chickadee.
A third hypothesis, which will only be tested if the SEEKING hypothesis is supported, is
the SEEKING + CARE hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests a connection between the general
call of the chickadee and in interaction between the homeostatic-related, SEEKING system and
the social attachment-related CARE system in producing the general call. Social network
analysis has demonstrated that the order of arrival at new food patches was non-random and
predicted by the strength of social affiliations in multiple species of Parids.134 This finding
suggests a connection between food recruitment and the social relationships formed with the
CARE system. If a SEEKING hypothesis is supported with the empirical work of chapters three
and four, the next step will to tests the influence of the CARE system on this system. All three of
these hypotheses are summarized in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: A summary of the FEAR and SEEKING hypotheses tested in chapters 3 and 4, and a proposed
hypothesis linking the CARE and SEEKING systems.
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CHAPTER 3: CHICKADEE FOOD DISCOVERY AND CALLING
Motivational Hypothesis Testing

“Without emotion you have a dead study. How can you possibly sit for months and look at
something you don’t particularly like, that you simply see as an object?”135

The primary purpose of the following experiments is to examine the possible
motivational forces which influence food-related calling in the Carolina chickadee. In order to
test whether food-related calling is best explained by a FEAR-related emotion connected to a
perceived predation risk or a SEEKING-based affect connected to the perceived hedonic value of
a discovered food source, we developed two separate experiments involving: 1) variations in the
quantity and quality of the food type and 2) cues of predator presence. In the first study, the type
and quantity of food was manipulated and the vocalizations of chickadees were recorded upon
the discovery of the food source. If food-related calling is motivated by the salience of the food
in the SEEKING system, we would anticipate an increase in calling rate when a large supply of
food, or a more desirable type of food, is available. However, if the calling is more motivated by
a FEAR system homeologue, we would anticipate an increase in calling when a cue of predator
presence is presented at the feeding site compared to a non-threatening species.
Focal Species
The primary species studied in this experimental series was the Carolina chickadee,
(Poecile carolinensis). Multiple studies conducted with this species confirm that it does not
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migrate over the winter months and individuals are often observed as members of small semistable flocks.136 These flocks typically maintain a consistent foraging area they will defend from
other such flocks. Carolina chickadees can often be found within the same areas as tufted titmice,
(Baeolophus bicolor) and white-breasted nuthatches, (Sitta carolinensis); and this grouping is
often referred to as a mixed-species flock.137 However it is uncertain if this arrangement is more
symbiotic or parasitic for any of these species.138 Carolina chickadees are, on average, the
smallest species in the mixed flock and are subordinate to both titmice and nuthatches. However,
on rare occasion chickadees have been observed supplanting members of the other species.139
Call Characteristics
Chickadees possess a complex and versatile vocal communication system, making them
an excellent target species for investigating the motivational aspects of signaling. Chickadees
often use a chick-a-dee call,140 141 hereafter referred to as the “general call,” consisting of
multiple note types.142 143A-notes and B-notes are high frequency notes that usually precede the
more broadband C-notes and D-notes (See Figure 3.1). The acoustic characteristics of these
broadband C-notes and D-notes make their source easier to locate by conspecifics or
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Figure 3.1: A Spectrogram depicting introductory (A and B) and D-notes found in the general call of the chickadee.
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predators.144 145Thus, the use of C-notes and D-notes in calls may function to recruit individuals
to the location of the signaler. C-notes have been associated with flight and food discovery.146 147
The D-notes have been observed in multiple contexts including predator contexts148 or food
recruitment.149
Since these experiments are attempting to discover the proximate emotion for foodassociated calling, we have avoided using stimuli that may be immediately threatening, such as
predator models. Predator models or novel stimuli are likely to produce mobbing behavior.150
The mobbing of a predator may be considered altruistic,151 but the underlying motivation factors
generating the aggressive mobbing behavior may be quite distinct from the motivation elements
provoking food-related calls, 152 which are presumably directed at flock mates.
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Site Locations
There were 20 observation sites used in this study. These sites were located in Eastern
Tennessee and North/Central Kentucky at multiple nature reserves, state parks, and private
residences (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: The location of the feeding sites for both food variation and predator cues studies.

Fort Boonesborough State Park, KY

3 Sites, 6 observations

Blue Licks Battlefield State Resort

3 Sites, 4 observations

Park, KY
Norris Dam State Park, TN

7 Sites, 20 observations

Ijams Nature Center, TN

4 Sites, 11 observations

Private Residences, KY

3 Sites, 4 observations

Equipment
Two previous pilot studies investigating food-related calling were terminated early due
to a) significant calling prior to the chickadees arriving at the site – possibly due to expectations
associated with the presence of the recording apparatus and b) calling seemingly provoked by
novel apparatus on or near the feeding platform. Vocalizations were observed when the
approaching birds were a significant distance from the feeding station, leaving open the multiple
possibilities that they could see the food on an open platform at large distances, were calling for
unrelated reasons, or that they were vocalizing expectations of food availability. Due to our
inability to distinguish between these possibilities, both present studies incorporated a “seed
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house” that obscured the amount of food available, if any, until the birds reached the opening of
the house. We have observed in previous studies that some members of the flocks frequently
check the location for food. Since most of these foraging attempts will result in an empty seed
house, we hoped to diminish possible anticipatory calling by offering no clues as to the contents
of the seed house until the target bird landed on the seed house.
Each research site consisted of a feeding platform modified with one of the seed houses.
The feeding platform was a wooden board approximately 60 cm X 30 cm, secured to the top of a
pole rising approximately 1.5 m from the ground. On top of the platform the seed house was
mounted with wood screws. The type and volume of food could not be observed by the birds
until the chickadees landed on the opening of the seed house. The seed house was an
approximately 26 cm X 26 cm X 31 cm wooden box with a triangular roof. The seed house
contained a large, approximately 22 cm X 24 cm, opening on the front to allow birds to enter and
take seed. A small, cylindrical, metal (tuna) can with an attached black button was attached to the
opposite side of the feeding platform. The black button served as a mock camera lens. During
experimental observation, the metal can with the mock lens was replaced by a metal can
containing a sports camera with a protruding black lens. The vocalizations, arrival at the site, and
foraging behavior of the birds were captured by the attached sports camera (Figure 3.2).
Subsequent sound analysis was conducted using Raven 1.5.

56

Figure 3.2: Experimental Apparatus used in Experiments 1 and 2.
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Habituation Period
At least ten days of habituation to the seed house took place before any observations were
recorded. During the habituation period the seed houses were stocked with ¼ cup of sunflower
seed with 5 dried meal worms on at least three days. Additionally, once the camera and audio
recording devices were activated, the researcher left the area to avoid any confounds related to
human presence. We anticipated that these changes would greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the
apparent expectancy calling and apparatus-related neophobia observed in the pilot studies.
Preferred Food Type Test
In order to document the difference in hedonic value of the food types used in this
experiment we first observed the food preferences of chickadees at five research sites. Several
different food types were placed on a seed stand at Ijams Nature Center in Eastern TN: black oil
sunflower seed, safflower seed, two varieties of suet, live mealworms, and dried mealworms.
Although chickadees have been observed eating all of these items on previous occasions, they
did not take suet or live mealworms during any of these presentations. On a separate day, 20
sunflower seeds, 20 safflower seeds, and 20 dried mealworms were presented on a platform and
recorded with a video camera. This process was repeated at two other sites for a total of three
sessions. At all of these sites the chickadees showed a clear preference for black oil sunflower
seed over safflower seed and a clear preference for safflower seeds over dried mealworms. The
results of this food preference test are shown in Appendix 1.
Conditions for Experiment 1 (Food Variation)
Following the ten day habituation period, we started audio and video recording of food
discovery reactions in foraging birds. The independent variable for this study was the amount
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and type of discoverable food available in the seed house. Our first session captured the feeding
behavior and vocalizations of the BASELINE condition. During the baseline condition the seed
house was be stocked with ¼ cup sunflower see used during habituation. During habituation, a
few mealworms were added to ensure that dried mealworms were not a novel food item for the
foraging chickadee. After at least one day following this baseline recording, the seed house was
stocked with one of the three experimental conditions: five sunflower seeds (SCARCE
condition), two cups of sunflower seed (ABUNDANCE condition), or ¼ cup of dried meal
worms (MEALWORM condition). The selection of these experimental conditions was
determined by a die roll between the closest research sites and counter-balanced to minimize the
influence of seasonal conditions. Following the recording session of the first experimental
condition, the site was restocked with BASELINE mix and left idle for at least one day. This
process of recording an experimental condition followed by a one day rest period was repeated
until all experimental conditions had been recorded.
Conditions for Experiment 2 (Predator Cue)
Following the study involving food variation at 20 sites, we conducted Experiment 2
using the same research sites from Experiment 1. Both conditions for Experiment 2 were similar
to the BASELINE condition in Study 1 in many respects. The same experimental apparatus was
used, including the seed house and sports camera, and ¼ cup of sunflower seed was placed in the
seed house. However, in Experiment 2 each condition was also accompanied by one of two audio
playbacks. One condition (OWL) consisted of 10 seconds of an Eastern screech owl (Megascops
asio) whinny call followed by 65 seconds of silence played on a loop. The other condition
(GOOSE) consisted of 10 seconds of a Canada goose (Branta Canadensis) calling followed by
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65 seconds of silence played on a loop. Both recordings were acquired from the Xeno-canto
database and edited to make the 75 second recordings.153 Playback audio was broadcast from a
speaker and iPod hidden in a camouflaged bag approximately 5 m from the seed house. A
summary of the conditions for both studies is included in Table 3.2.
Recording Durations
The time between recording onset and bird arrival varied in each session. However, each
session lasted at least five minutes after a bird arrived on the feeding station. Due to concerns
surrounding observer interference we established a few a priori observation exclusion rules.
Exclusion Rule 1: If during any recording session a bird was observed before the researcher
could activate the recording device and retreat to the 50 m safe distance, that recording session
was terminated, the seed house was restocked with BASELINE mix, and attempts to observe the
site were abandoned for an addition 20 hour period. Exclusion Rule 2: If a chickadee was not
the first bird to discover the food source, another attempt was made to capture chickadee food
discovery following another BASELINE restocking.
Experimental Measures
The primary dependent variable in all conditions of both studies was the number of general calls
in the 30 second target window of food discovery. The target window of 30 seconds was chosen
because it was judged to be long enough to record the initial reaction to the available food
source, and a longer observation period might have captured general calls that were unrelated to
food source in the seed house. This 30 window began once a chickadee landed on the seed house

Xeno Canto audio files: XC153434-eastern_screech_owl_whinny_Todd Wilson // Canadian Goose1_XC289219CANG Garrett MacDonald
153
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Table 3.2: A summary of experimental conditions for studies 1 and 2.

Study 1 Conditions

Food Type/Volume in Seed House

Playback Stimuli

BASELINE

1/4 cup of Sunflower Seed

None

SCARCE

5 Sunflower Seeds

None

ABUNDANCE

2 cups of Sunflower Seed

None

MEALMORM

1/4 cup of Dried Mealworms

None

Study 2 Conditions

Food Type/Volume in Seed House

Playback Stimuli

OWL

1/4 cup of Sunflower Seed

10 seconds of Owl per 75 seconds

GOOSE

1/4 cup of Sunflower Seed

10 seconds of Goose per 75 seconds
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opening. If the hedonic value of the discovered food is an important stimulus in motivating foodrelated calls, we would expect an increase in this calling when large amounts of food are
discovered (ABUNDANCE) versus small amounts of food (SCARCE) or less desired food
(MEALWORM). If the motivation for calling is more closely linked to mitigating predation
threat, we would anticipate more calling when predator cues are present (OWL) than nonpredatory bird (GOOSE). We used a mixed-model ANOVA to compare the general calls of
chickadees across food conditions in Study 1. A paired t-test was used to compare calls between
the GOOSE and OWL conditions in Study 2.

Results
Out of the total number of 80 data collection attempts in the food variation study (4
conditions at 20 sites) we were able to obtain 45 usable observations. Observations were
excluded from analysis for several reasons: chickadees did not appear at the site during video
recording (28 instances), other species arrived at the site before the target species and interrupted
their foraging (6 instances), the researcher presence during camera maintenance interfered with
naturalistic observation and violated our a priori exclusion rule (1 instance) Out of the total
number of 40 data collection attempts in the predator cue study, (2 conditions at 20 sites) we
were only able to collect 24 paired, usable observations. Chickadees did not appear at the site
during video recording in 14 instances. Two other observations were excluded because only one
of two conditions was captured for that site.
The results from the food variation study did not align with our a priori predictions. In
the first study, where we manipulated the amount and type of food available at the seed station,
we detected no difference in calling between any of the conditions F(3,41) = 1.427, p = .25.
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There was no statistical difference between large and small amounts of food and no difference
between preferred food types over non-preferred types (Figure 3.3). A similar, non-significant
result was also obtained with D-notes F(3,41)= 1.15, p = .34, and C-notes F(3,41) = 0.44, p
= .72. Not only were there no significant differences between conditions, only the minority (18
out of 45, or 40%) of these observations, across all conditions, had detectable calling in the 30
seconds after landing on the seed house. In most of the recordings no calling was observed.
Additional data are located in Appendices 2, 3, and 4.

Figure 3.3: Number of chickadee general calls under various conditions.

The results of Study 2, our predator cue study, were also unanticipated. When calling
patterns were compared during an Eastern Owl or Canadian Goose playback, there was again no
detectable difference between these conditions t(11) = -0.41, p = .69. Just as in the food
variation study, we detected chickadee calling only in a minority (7 of 26, or 27 %) of the total
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analyzed recordings. See Figure 3.4.

Figure 3.4: General calls while foraging when owl or goose calls played.

Analysis and Interpretation
As discussed in Mahurin & Freeberg, the lack of consistent calling by Carolina
Chickadees when arriving at a food source suggests that what has been described as “foodrelated calling” is unlikely to be referential to food.154 The birds may be responding to the
presence or absence of specific conspecifics, subtle changes in the experimental apparatus,
nearby semi-hostile avian species, or other motivational or environmental factors. It is also
possible that the chickadees are conditionally responding to the presence of food, albeit under a
yet undetermined set of conditions.
Neither primary hypothesis, that avian calling near a food sources has a FEAR-based
motivation, as might be predicted by predator defense hypothesis, or a SEEKING-based

Mahurin, E. J., & Freeberg, T. M. (2009). Chick-a-dee call variation in Carolina chickadees and recruiting
flockmates to food. Behavioral Ecology, 20(1), 111–116.
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motivation, which might be expected in cooperative foraging, were directly supported in this
study. If the avian homeologue of fear of predation had been the primary motivation, we would
have expected to see an increase in calling when owl vocalizations were played versus goose
vocalizations. No such calling increase was observed. If the avian homeologue of hedonic
arousal had been the primary motivational factor, we should have observed an increase in calling
when large amounts of highly preferred food were available compared to small amounts of food
or less-preferred food types. However, calling differential by food characteristics was not
observed.
In order to interpret our unanticipated results, we must first address some of the
limitations of our study. One such limitation concerns the continued effects of novelty. While we
observed much less novelty-related calling prior to the chickadees arriving at the feeding
platform, there was some evidence that at least some chickadees noticed a difference between the
apparatus present during experimental sessions and the apparatus present during habituation or
between experimental observations. A few of the birds appeared to inspect the camera lens
during their foraging. Thus, we cannot rule out the experimental apparatus introduced a potential
confound into our data by disproportionally affecting one condition more than another. However,
we have no reason to suspect that this observational noise, however robust, would operate
differentially across the conditions, and the counter-balancing of the food/sound presentations
should have mitigated the risk of this confound.
There is also the possibility that the owl and goose playback stimuli we used in our
second study were perceived by the chickadees as either neutral stimuli or more as an auditory
novelty than as a cue of predator presence. The primary reason why we entertain this possibility
is that there was no increased latency to approach and subsequently forage from the seed house
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when the owl stimulus was playing than when the goose stimulus was playing. There are several
possible explanations for the lack of approach latency. The chickadees may not perceive Eastern
screech owls, or at least their whinny, to be a significant indication of a predatory threat, at least
during daylight hours – and all of our data were captured after sunrise. However, this possibility
is contradicted by previous research showing increases in chickadee calling in response to owl
vocalizations.155 We also have heard both goose calls and owl calls at most of the research sites
in previous seasons. It is possible that chickadees, at these specific locations, have ceased
perceiving these calls as any indication of threat. It may be the silent owls that are the primary
source of threat. Another possibility is that the repetitive aspect of the looped calls may have
allowed for rapid habituation to the calls, or lead to the determination that they were from an
inauthentic source of predation threat. Whatever may be the reason for the lack of calling in
response to our playback stimuli, as a pseudoreplicated design, we are hesitant to interpret our
results as representative of a typical chickadee response to predation threat.156
Despite these caveats, there is still reason for us to believe that the general chick-a-dee
call is not closely linked to imminent predation threat. When we had the chance to observe a
predator, such as a hawk, entering the research area the typical reaction consisted of either
ceasing vocalizations completely, or emitting only soft, high-frequency vocalizations. Instead of
perching conspicuously on or near the feeder, when a significant danger was detected, the
chickadees would retreat to nearby foliage and scan their surroundings.157 These observations
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also suggest that our playback stimuli used in this study did not provoke significant predation
defense behavior. No hiding or conspicuous scanning was noticed. These chance observations
with live predators in the field suggest that the general call is not utilized when predation threat
is high and the predator is not actively targeting a flock-member. These observations raise
significant question about how Carolina chickadees evaluate predation threat in response to the
presentation playback stimuli.
The pilot studies preceding Experiments 1 & 2 suggested that the first bird to arrive at the
site would most often be a Carolina chickadee. During these pilot studies, Carolina chickadees
were disproportionately the most frequent first visitor, followed by the tufted titmouse, and on
rare occasions, the white-breasted nuthatch. This, however, was not the pattern that we observed
during Experiments 1 & 2. For unknown reasons, possibly related to the differences in chickadee
and titmouse memory, neophobia directed at the added seed houses, or an undetermined set of
ecological influences, tufted titmice were more likely to be the first visitor to check the seed
houses for food. The call data from the titmice have not been analyzed, but the initial indications
suggest that titmice also do not call in response to food discovery.
This set of experiments was initially devised to test whether the general call was more
likely to be motivated by the perceived hedonic value of a discovered food source or more likely
motivated by the FEAR of a predation threat. Our results suggest that there is no significant link
between the general calls and food discovery – at least during the late winter conditions of
Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. There are certainly many other means by which the chickadees
could communicate the presence of a food source, but the general chick-a-dee call does not
appear to be primary mechanism for this information.
As for the hypothesis that the general call is motivated by a predation-induced FEAR, we
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are much more tentative in our interpretation. Our observations during these studies and prior lab
experiments suggest to us that imminent threats suppress calling and moderate threat cues
increase calling. At this point we cannot determine if the owl vocalizations failed to promote
calling because they did not generate enough perceived threat, they reached a threshold of threat
that suppresses calling, or the general call is not closely linked predation threat. Only future
studies can address these and other explanations for the sparse calling observed in Study 2.
We then arrive at a tentative conclusion based on study 1 and 2 that the perceived hedonic values
of food are unlikely to be an adequate motivational explanation of what has been called “foodrelated calling” in the Carolina chickadee. Our results also did not support the hypothesis of a
FEAR-related motivation for the general call, but due to the limitations of our stimuli, this
hypothesis remains a plausible explanation. Only further experimentation will be able to
determine the likely motivation factors that precede the general call of the Carolina chickadee.

68

CHAPTER 4: REPLICATIONS AND REVISIONS
A Hypothesis Rejected, A Hypothesis Proposed

“Perhaps the most basic emotion that motivates cooperative behavior is affiliation— a sense
of liking and a feeling of closeness.”158

In the previous chapter, we attempted to determine if the apparent food-related calls of
the Carolina chickadee are more likely to be motivated by the negative affect of predation threat,
or motivated by a positive affect related to hedonic value of food. We tested this assertion in two
ways. In the first experiment, we varied the type and amount of food available within a seed
house that obscured the type of food available. Once a chickadee landed upon the seed house the
type and amount of food available would be visible to the chickadee. If the general call of the
chickadee was indeed motivated by SEEKING-related affect, we should see variations in the
amount of these calls upon the differences in hedonic value of the discovered food. But this
“hedonic hypothesis” was not supported by our observations. We found no evidence that the
chickadees used their general call any differently according to variations in food type or volume
of food available.
In our second experiment we examined the effect of predator cues on the chickadee’s
general call. We placed a moderate amount of food in the seed house while either a goose or owl
recording played on a loop. If the general call was motivated by a FEAR related to predation, we
should see an increase in these calls when subtle cues of a predator, like an owl recording, were
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present. This hypothesis was also not supported by our observations. There was no apparent
difference in the use of the general call when an owl or goose call was played at the site. The
findings from both of these experiments raise many important questions concerning the general
call of the Carolina chickadee in both of the hypothesized affective explanations. Our
experiments reveal an inconsistent connection, a weak association, or no association at all
between available food and the general call. These experiments also suggest that certain auditory
cues are insufficient for producing FEAR-motivated calls, if indeed the general call is motivated
by a FEAR homeologue.
In order to better interpret these findings, it was important to verify that there is little
association between the general call and food discovery. In order to test this connection we
conducted a simple experiment where the call patterns of chickadees were compared when they
discovered food in a seed house versus when they arrived at an empty seed house. If there is no
difference in the patterns of general calls used when food is available or not available in the seed
house, this is strong evidence against a SEEKING-based motivation for the general call.

Methods
Focal Species and Vocalizations
As in the previous experiments, the focal species in this study was the Carolina
chickadee, (Poecile carolinensis). Also, as in the previous studies, the chickadee general call was
the target vocalizations for observations. The D-notes used in these calls are broadband signals
that possess the greatest acoustic capacity for being detected, and for their location to be
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triangulated by the signal receiver.159 The D-notes in the general call were also the focus of the
2009 Mahurin and Freeberg playback study using calls with a various number of D-notes per
call.160 In that study they found that the latency to arrive to a feeding stand was shorter for
chickadees when the playback vocalizations contained more D-notes. In the present study we are
attempting to focus on the role of the signaler food availability. We are attempting to test whether
chickadees emit more general calls (with embedded D-notes) when they discover food in the
seed houses versus an empty seed house.
Site Locations
There were 22 observation sites used in this study. These sites were located in Eastern
Tennessee and North/Central Kentucky at multiple nature reserves, state parks, and private
residences (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Locations of the research sites used in Study 3.

Fort Boonesborough State Park, KY

2 Sites, 4 Observations

Blue Licks Battlefield State Resort Park, KY

3 Sites, 6 Observations

Norris Dam State Park, TN

4 Sites, 6 Observations

UTK Forestry Station, TN

10 Sites, 14 Observations

Private Residences, KY

3 Sites, 2 Observations

Morton, E. S. (1977). On the occurrence and significance of motivation-structural rules in some bird and
mammal sounds. The American Naturalist, 111(981), 855-869.
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Mahurin, E. J., & Freeberg, T. M. (2009). Chick-a-dee call variation in Carolina chickadees and recruiting
flockmates to food. Behavioral Ecology, 20(1), 111–116.
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71

Equipment
The equipment used in this experiment was similar to studies described in Chapter 3 with
a few alterations. Just as in the previous study we used a 26 cm X 26 cm X 31 cm seed house
mounted on a feeding stand approximately 1.5 m from the ground. However, in this experiment
the seed house was altered to change the position of the camera. On the altered seed house for
experiment 3, the camera was mounted the back of the seed house (see Figure 4.1). This location
of the camera was changed for two reasons. First, a camera mounted on the back of the seed
house contained within a plastic container would be less conspicuous for birds entering from the
front of the seed house. There was what appeared to be neophobia by some birds directed toward
the camera mount in experiments 1 and 2 after the habituation period had ended. There was also
one instance where a tufted titmouse pecked at the camera lens. Whatever the motivation for this
pecking, we believed it would be best to move the camera assembly to a less conspicuous area.

Figure 4.1: Experimental apparatus, with rear-mounted camera used in Experiments 1 and 2.
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The second reason why the camera assembly was relocated to the back of the seed house
was to increase the recording capacity of the sports camera. The original experimental setup
allowed for approximately two hours of recording with that standard battery capacity of the
sports camera. By relocating the camera to the rear of the seed house we were able to add a USB
power source that increased the recording capacity of the sports camera to approximately nine
hours of 1080p @ 30fps footage. The camera and power source were located in a removable
plastic container painted black to obscure its contents. In order to ensure that that there was
sufficient light for recording, we also replaced a circular section of wood on top of the seed
house with a translucent white plastic. The plastic allowed enough light to enter the seed house to
allow the camera to capture video without revealing the contents of the seed house. In addition to
the adapted seed houses, we also used three seed houses with a new design. These seed houses
were similar to the original seed houses except that the sides of the new seed houses were also
translucent white plastic and they contained a perch on the front of the seed house that provided
landing position for the chickadees that was within the field of view of the camera (see Figure
4.2).

Figure 4.2: The Number of General Calls between the NO SEED and SEED conditions.
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Habituation
At least ten days of habituation for the seed house took place before any observations
were recorded. During the habituation period, seed houses were stocked with approximately ¼
cup of sunflower seed on at least three separate occasions.
Conditions and Recording Procedure
Following the habituation period, recording for the experimental and control conditions
began. The researchers set up the camera and began recording around sunrise each morning. The
cameras were left recording for at least five hours, but usually until the battery was depleted
approximately nine hours later. After the camera setup, the seed house was immediately prepared
for the experimental conditions. There were only two conditions in this study. Either the seed
house contained approximately ¼ cup of sunflower seed (SEED condition) or it was left empty
(NO SEED condition). The time between recording onset and bird arrival varied for each
session. However, each session lasted at least five minutes after a bird arrived on the feeding
station. Due to concerns surrounding observer interference we maintained the primary data
exclusion rule used in experiments 1 and 2. If during any recording session a bird was observed
before the researcher could activate the recording device and retreat to the 50 m safe distance,
that recording session was terminated.
Experimental Measures
The primary dependent variable in this experiment, as in the prior experiments, was the
number of general chickadee calls and the D-notes contained in these calls during the target
temporal window of food discovery. From the moment when a chickadee landed on the seed
house we compared the general call 15 seconds after landing, and 15 seconds prior to landing
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between the SEED and NO SEED conditions (see Table 4.2). This time window was reduced
from 30 seconds used in Study 1 & 2 in order avoid including calls unrelated to food-discovery
that may have been captured in the prior studies and to allow for a comparison for calls make
before and after landing on the seed house.

Table 4.2: Experimental Conditions for Experiment 3.

Condition
Seed

Target Measure
# General Calls 15 seconds before landing
# General Calls 15 seconds after landing

No Seed

# General Calls 15 seconds before landing
# General Calls 15 seconds after landing

Replication Results
Of the total 20 research sites, we were able to obtain data for both NO SEED and SEED
conditions from 16 sites. Four of the sites were missing one of the conditions because either
birds did not arrive at the site during a recording period (3), or a corrupted audio file (1). Using a
standard paired t-test, we found no significant difference between the number of calls emitted by
chickadees after arriving at the seed house when there was seed present in the seed house versus
when the seed house was empty t(15) = - 0.84, p = .42 (see Figure 4.2). Similar results were
obtained with the analysis of D-notes t(15) = 1.23, p = .24, and C-notes t(15) = -1.26, p = .23
(see Appendices 7 and 8). In 67 % of all of our observations of the general call, covering both
conditions (24 of 36 obs.), they maintained the same pattern of vocalizations before and after
landing on the seed house. If they emitted no vocalizations before landing on the seed house,
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they emitted no detectable vocalizations after landing. If they were calling prior to landing, they
continued to call afterward. During the NO SEED condition there were six instances (16.7%)
and during the SEED condition there were three instances (8.3%) where detectable calling was
observable after landing on the seed house, but no calling was observed prior to landing.
Conversely, during the NO SEED condition there were two instances (5.5%) where calling was
detected prior to landing, but not after. There was once instance (2.8%) in the SEED condition
where calling was detected prior to landing, but not after. These findings are not consistent with a
strong link between food availability and the general call of the Carolina chickadee.
There were numerous supplants and other agonistic behavior during these observations.
Most of these instances of aggression were interspecific. Tufted titmice supplanted chickadees
and white-breasted nuthatches supplanted titmice and chickadees. We mention these occurrences
because there seemed to be greater reluctance on the part of the chickadees to enter the seed
house than in previous studies. Although we believe the seed houses were effective in obscuring
the seed from view, using them may have also created a more dangerous foraging environment
for the chickadees. The avenues for escape within the seed house were much more limited than
when seed is placed on an open seed stand, the most common stimulus display method used in
previous studies. This change in apparatus may or may not have affected the calling behavior of
the chickadees in this experiment.
We also analyzed regional differences in calling behavior. When we combined all of our
observations from Study 1, 2, and 3 into one data pool, we found no differences between sites
located in Kentucky and Tennessee t(106) = -0.35, p = .72. Thus, whatever the explanation for
the lack calling between conditions, they do not appear to be influenced by differences in
regional ecology (see Appendix 9).
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Discussion
The results of this study and the studies conducted in the previous chapter combine to
indicate that the general call of the Carolina chickadee is not, in any significant way, referential
to food. This possible dissociation between food availability, certain owl vocalizations, and the
general call of the Carolina chickadee have important implications for the motivational question
of the general call. In light of these findings, it is useful to review the documented use of the
general call in Carolina chickadees, and closely-related black-capped chickadees, in multiple
contexts. That is, we start at the beginning:
(1) The general call is ubiquitous. It can be heard any time of year and there is often no
obvious stimulus which provokes the call. This suggests that the motivation for using the call
must be commonly experienced. 161 162 163
(2) Novelty increases the use of the general call. When novel stimuli are present on
feeding apparatus chickadees emit robust calling behavior.164 In our own pilot studies, we
noticed that any alternation to the feeding platform greatly increased the call. Since the presence
of this novelty delayed their foraging, this might suggest that the motivation leading to the call
possesses a negative valence.
(3) During Experiments 1-3, and the preceding pilot studies, the general call was often
heard prior to, and at significant distances from, the chickadees arriving at the research site. This
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suggests that the motivation was influenced by either the anticipation of foraging at the seed
house or related to the movement of the flock.165
(4) Exposure to, and orientation of, predator models increases the use of the general
call.166 There are multiple other examples where predator models elicit general calls.167 Again,
the subjective experience of the chickadee calling under these conditions would more likely be
negative than positive.
(5) The general call is also emitted by the male after returning with food to a nest with
hatchlings.168 The motivational experience of the male in this context is difficult to interpret. The
male may be experiencing the excitement of a return to the nest, or signaling a longing for their
mate, or some other motivation.
(6) The earliest use of the general call in hatchlings occurs between nine to twelve
days.169 The use of the call on a least one of these occasions corresponded with fellow hatchlings
being removed from the nest.170 There is a strong probability here that the motivation valence
was negative.
(7) The general call is also linked to territorial disputes and disturbances at the nest.171 In
both of these instances we would anticipate a high degree of motivation and a negative emotional
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valence.
(8) Although not well-documented in the empirical studies included in this dissertation,
there was more than one instance in these experiments and in previous pilot studies when a
chickadee arrived at the site, took a few seeds, and then left the area using the general call.
Several minutes later, a flock of chickadees arrived at the site. The motivation behind the general
call here was originally assumed to be positive – a response to a highly-desired reinforcer.
However, the calling bird in this instance could have been also motivated by their isolation from
their flock mates, such as in the FEAR-based hypothesis summarized in chapter 3.172
(9) The general call from the chickadee also can be elicited, not from direct contact with a
threating stimulus, but from the response of tufted titmice exposure to a predator.173 This
eavesdropping can be difficult to interpret from a motivational standpoint. We must assume that
chickadees have some sense of how titmice respond to various stimuli, including predator
presence. However, given the nature of the original stimulus, it is more likely that the general
call, used here, reflects a negative emotion.
(10) Nesting mate pairs will also use the general call during the search for a nest location.
A portion of one of these occurrences was captured on video. During this exchange a pair of
chickadees approximately 2 m away and oriented toward a nest box reciprocated general calls for
approximately 70 seconds. The apparent object of interest was the nest box. Similar nesting
exchanges have been documented by other researchers as well.174
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Revised Motivational Models for General Call
A simultaneous examination of all of these contexts where the general call has been
observed reveals at least two possible motivational explanations for this behavior. The first
explanation centers on an observer effect. In all of these contexts there was, we assume, a human
researcher present to observe and/or record the calling. It is a possible and parsimonious
hypothesis that the presence of a human observer is an unintentional motivational source for this
calling. Similar to a FEAR-based motivational hypothesis related to predation, the presence of a
human observer may also have a FEAR-related emotional root as one of the chief motivational
elements producing the general call. The much-cited Elgar study discussed in chapter 2 used the
researcher as the threat source in evaluating house sparrow calls.175 Our own evidence for this
hypothesis can be summarized by the common element of a human observer across all of the
conditions in our pilot study and the unanticipated finding in our experiments that as the
“observational footprint” in our methodology decreases, so does the amount of observed general
calls. This is not to say that humans are the primary stimulus responsible for the general call of
the chickadee, but one or more of the above contexts may have been misinterpreted due to
observer effects. We must face the possibility that our presence with the chickadees is creating, at
least in some contexts, the phenomena we observe.
A second possibility that has been suggested is that simple arousal, and not one of
Panksepp’s primary emotions, may be the motivational factor provoking the chickadee general
call across these various contexts. At present we are unconvinced that arousal is a likely
motivational candidate for at least two reasons. The first reason is that simple arousal is too
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vague of a concept to fit into a 5th Aim ethology. All of Panksepp’s primary emotions could be
described as types, or subtypes, of arousal. LUST is the emotional root of sexual arousal.
SEEKING is the raw desire promoting appetitive behavior. All out these primary emotions would
have, to some degree, an influence on a general arousal. Panksepp has added specificity to the
types of arousal experienced by the organism making the classical conceptualization od arousal
somewhat obselete. The second reason why we do not pursue simple arousal as an explanation is
that it is not consistent with our empirical evidence. We discovered no significant difference in
the amount general calls produced when large amounts or food were available, small amounts, or
no food at all was present. There was also no detectable difference in calling when owl or goose
vocalizations were played at the sites. We would anticipate some difference in one of these
conditions if general arousal was the motivational driver. We thus do not pursue arousal as likely
motivational force preceding the general due to its conceptual incompatibility with our emotional
model and its inability to explain our experimental results.
A third explanation, and with the current evidence we believe is the most probable, is that
the general call is motivated by a pervasive “desire to affiliate” in chickadees. This hypothesized
motivation is similar to Panksepp’s GRIEF/PANIC system176 in that it would be experienced as a
negative emotion prompted by environmental stressors, such as novelty or predators cues, or by
isolation, such as when conspecifics are conspicuously absent. This general desire to affiliate
could be communicated by chickadees, most often, via the general call under a number of
diverse circumstances. This proposed desire to affiliate, and the accompanying general call,
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together would form the basis of a “social cohesion”177 effect of the call, or what was once
referred to as “the herd instinct”— although “flocking instinct” may be a better descriptor for an
avian species. Figure 4.3 illustrates these two motivational models within the context of the
observable call patterns of the chickadees.

Figure 4.3: A revision of the hypothesized motivations for the chickadee general call.

Although speculative, there is some evidence to suggest that the motivational role of this
general call, within the “desire to affiliate” motivational hypothesis, might not merely relate
information about the motivational state of one bird to other conspecifics. The general call (or at
least some components of the call such as D-notes) may also have a role in emotional contagion.
Upon hearing the general call, a signal receiver might experience an increase in the desire to
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affiliate, and an increased probability of generating the call themselves. If the general call of the
chickadee does play a role in emotional contagion, this might explain many instances of the
general call, such as mobbing behavior, or a response to stimulus that is hidden to conspecifics,
such as in the Hetrick and Sieving study. In this experiment the researchers played recordings of
tufted titmouse vocalizations as they responded to different predators types. They found that
chickadee vocalizations reflected aspects of the titmouse call patterns adding the additional
prospect that intraspecific emotional contagion can occur via homological motivational signals.
A general “desire to affiliate” motivational hypothesis could explain many of the
functional effects of the general call. A general call motivated by a conspicuous absence from a
mate could readily function as a food recruitment mechanism. One of the reasons chickadees
might have failed to use a general call in our experiments is that in most instances they arrive at
the site with their mate, or perhaps other flock members, already in close proximity. The
hypothesized desire to affiliate would already have been satisfied. Mobbing could be explained
as: 1) a novel or threating stimulus activates a desire to affiliate, 2) a call is generated, 3) this call
attracts other chickadees, and 4) the call increases the likelihood of other calls being emitted via
emotional contagion or exposure to the original stimulus. A general desire to affiliate could also
help explain how a call used during mobbing, could be the same as the call used during the care
of offspring. In summary, a core motivational system based on a fundamental desire to affiliate,
with an accompanying signal that communicates and proliferates this motivation, could function
to “close formation” in multiple contexts where an increase in proximity would be adaptive.
The “desire to affiliate” motivational hypothesis also aligns with Darwin’s emphasis on
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“filial affections,”178 Preston’s evolutionary model of cooperation based upon offspring care,179
any many other proposals and findings described in the previous chapters. This motivational
hypothesis is also parsimonious in that it does not rely on higher-order cognitive capacities. The
chickadee need only be able to recognize the presence of, and form bonds with, select
conspecifics, and possess the ability to associate certain stimuli, such as threating objects, with
that motivational system.
Despite the failure of our three experiments to determine the motivational basis of the
chickadee general call, we still possess some clues about the chickadee ethos based upon the
work of other researchers and our significant field experience. If we are to informally describe
the ethos of the chickadee, with our own observations and other available evidence, we might
conclude that they are a “family-centered” species. Adult chickadees invest heavily into the wellbeing of their mates and hatchlings. From courtship and mating to when fledglings are escorted
into their new environments, parenting plays a very large role in the life cycle of the Carolina
chickadee. Chickadees also seem to be a wary bird. They display very acute sensitivity to
changes in their environment. The smallest change in our stimulus can create a significant
apprehension to approach a pile of sunflower seed. Chickadees also appear much less aggressive
than other species with which they congregate. Chickadees do display intraspecific aggression in
the form of supplants and other harassing behavior. However, we have not yet witnessed the
degree of belligerence a nuthatch might direct at titmice and chickadee. Some of these agonistic
encounters could only be described as brutal – an aggression used with a goal to harm the other
bird instead of using force with a goal of getting a seed. If chickadees use these intense forms of
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aggression, from what we can determine, it is only on rare occasions.
Given this short ethological narrative of the chickadee, they still appear to possess a set of
qualities that make them an excellent candidate for investigations into the fundamentals of
character morality. Their substantial parental investment is congruent with a Darwinian proposal
that moral behavior emerges from offspring care. Their subdued aggression suggests that outright
physical dominance is not the primary tool in their evolutionary kit of adaptations. However,
their wariness of novelty and change makes them difficult to study. We hope in future research to
be able to better asses the motivational character of the chickadee. Their sensitivity to both
equipment and human presence carries with it a constant threat of confounds. If we study the
subtleties of chickadee motivation, we must ourselves be subtle.
In light of our findings we can now return to a questioned raised in a previous chapter. Is
the use of the general call elicited in proximity to food, as proposed by Ficken,180 an example of
altruism? We believe the answer to this question depends more upon the perspective of the
scientist than the data itself. Using a 5th-Aim ethology approach, we believe that the best current
motivational explanation for the chickadee general call is some sense of social deprivation – the
call represents a felt desire to affiliate. One researcher may frame this motivation as “selfish”—
the bird calls in order to satisfy their own desire for affiliation. Another researcher might
consider a desire to share experiences, both positive and negative, with conspecifics as the
opposite, or nearing the opposite, of selfishness. One researcher may focus on the shared
advantages of this motivation in mobbing contexts, recruitment, early warnings, etc., and find
many examples of cooperation, or in some instances, altruism. Another researcher may focus on
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the advantages to the individuals using the general call and classify the behavior as an example
of mutualism. We leave these interpretive decisions to the reader and their chosen philosophy.
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CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS AND DIRECTIONS
Narratives, Parallels, Dangers

“If it were not so frightening it would be amusing to observe the pride and complacency with
which we, like children, take apart the watch, pull out the spring and make a toy of it, and are
then surprised when the watch stops working.”181

Character, or ethos, has been the consistent theme of this entire dissertation. Throughout
these chapters we have been looking for the emotional roots that compose the ethos of the
Carolina chickadee. We have made progress on this front, but are still at a mere beginning in our
understanding of the chickadee ethos. We thus arrive at one obvious criticism that could be
directed at this dissertation: it presents a significantly ambitious theoretical framework for
morality and adds little empirical evidence in support of this framework. This is a certainly a just
criticism. Our framework describes morality as either, 1) a matrix of an individual’s emotions
associated with various objects or concepts (Ethos), or 2), a shared set of behavioral rules,
norms, or expectations of a group (Culture). Our empirical work altogether ignores, for now, the
cultural aspects of morality in chickadees. Our work with chickadees leads us to suspect that
some social norms or expectations may exist in this species, but we have added no evidence to
support or refute this claim. The empirical work is also quite narrow in its capacity to reveal the
chickadee ethos. The experiments described in chapters three and four are designed to examine
the link between a specific emotion and one behavior – the general call of the chickadee.
We started by examining how chickadees use their general call when they discover food.
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We have concluded, at least during the late winter months in Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee,
that they do not use their call consistently when they do discover a food source. Chickadees may
behave differently at other times of year. They may use their call before arriving at our seed
houses. There are many possible explanations for our findings. But at present, it appears unlikely
that a Pankseppian SEEKING system plays a significant motivational role in the general call of
the chickadee.
We also examined the role of predation FEAR as a motivational factor behind the
chickadee call. Again, the results of the study do not support this interpretation. The particular
study performed here was quite limited. We compared the vocal reactions of the chickadees to
the calls of two other avian species, an owl and a goose. We may have obtained substantially
different results had we used different stimuli – hawk instead of a goose, or a different type of
owl vocalization. But even with these limitations, there is other research suggesting that FEAR is
also an unlikely motivation source of the general call. FEAR does not explain the frequent use of
the general call near the nest or in seemingly innocuous foraging conditions. Failing to support
either hypothesis we are left to speculation. A new hypothesis is warranted.
Evaluating these finding in light of our larger framework, we must admit that our model
has developed very little as a result of these experiments. We are much more confident in our
falsification of SEEKING as a probable proximate emotion for the general call than our
hypotheses of FEAR or GREIF/PANIC being the primary emotional explanation. We find
ourselves in a position much like an architect with a grand set of blueprints and vacant parcel of
land. In our experiments we hoped to discover our first usable emotional “brick” in the
construction of a chickadee ethos. However, we have found this particular “brick” to be
incompatible with our empirical evidence. Our only progress on this framework is falsifying one
88

proposed proximate emotion for one type of vocal behavior. Yet, we still believe our approach is
defensible for two important reasons.
The first reason comes from the history of the sciences. Important advances in the
sciences often come from a major reconceptualization of an important phenomenon. Both natural
selection and quantum mechanics did not emerge quickly and seamlessly from a belief in a static
ecology or Newtonian physics. The advance in the sciences only came through a steady
presentation of (for many, disquieting) evidence. We cannot compare our moral framework to
natural selection or quantum mechanics in its importance or genius. The gulf between our
contribution to science and those of Darwin or Bohr is comically vast. We do, however, argue
that same principle of assumption re-evaluation applies to morality as it does to the nature of
heredity or the mysteries of the atom. The very concept of morality, with all of its entanglements
with the ever-changing spirit of the age, various religious traditions, post-modern philosophy,
and a ‘red in tooth-and-claw’ evolutionary perspective is ripe for a fresh reconceptualization. A
new wineskin for the new wine of an objective moral science.
The second reason that may help to justify our ambitious framework is that it helps
expand upon other important scientific models. One of these models, and the one we are best
qualified to speak about, is the Social Complexity Hypothesis for Communication (SCHC).
The SCHC argues that increased social complexity of a species predicts an increased complexity
in that species’ vocalizations.182 This complexity has been measured in numerous ways
including group size, group density, diversity of roles, the status of group members, or the
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number of relationships with group members.183 Many of these conceptualized measures can be
visualized using various statistical or visual modeling techniques. We propose here that
emotional complexity, though much harder to quantify, may prove to be an important component
linking communication with social complexity. The general call is believed to play a significant
functional role in the social cohesion of chickadee or mixed species flocks.184 185 186 Variation in
the acoustic structure and note composition of the general call has been associated with
phenotypic variations in individuals, flocks, or environmental cues.187 188One of the chief goals
within our studies is to discover the emotion underpinning this social cohesion and to understand
an additional level of phenotypic variation that likely exists in the chickadee. Social complexity,
we assume, begins with individual complexity. Hence, to study emotion is to study the
fundamentals of sociality. And the very concept of complexity is exceedingly abstract until we
are able to describe it in ways identifiable to an observer. Emotion, even in its most primal form
as described in a Pankseppian system, provides a small bridge to understanding the concept of
social complexity beyond the calculus of population metrics.
In order to illustrate the potential connection of emotion to social complexity we begin
with a description of a simple organism capable of experiencing only one emotion in a
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dichotomous on/off state – though we are uncertain whether such an organism could exist in
nature. Perhaps an insect that was capable of only experiencing pain or to remain in a state of no
experience. This dichotomous emotional capacity would be the simplest imaginable form of
motivational complexity. Other organisms, which are able to experience multiple emotions that
range on a continuum of affect, would possess much greater motivational complexity. As these
various emotions become associated with various stimuli, an increasing complex moral
character, or ethos, emerges. The complexity of the ethos, and the ethos of other group members,
influences the complexity of the culture via vocal communication. Emotional complexity, as
viewed through the lens of the SCHC, becomes an individual-level predictor of communication
and social complexity, and vice versa. The more complex the emotional range of the individual,
we would predict the more complexity found within social organization and communication.189 A
simplified depiction of this connection is depicted in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1: The hypothetical connection between an ethos, social complexity and communicative complexity.

According to our moral framework and the SCHC we should not be surprised when
individuals of an emotionally complex species (as estimated with Burghardt’s critical
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anthropomorphism or Panksepp’s triangulation method) are able to express high levels of
socially complex behavior. Chimpanzees appear to target their food-related calls at specific
conspecifics,190 while ants utilize a less complex and more colony-targeted chemical signaling
system.191 These are just two examples of the comparative of correlational evidence supporting
the SCHC.192 193 194 But there is a need to experimentally test the SCHC by examining the
relationship between social dynamics and communication at the individual, population, and
species levels to determine if longer-term changes in social structure might serve as a selection
pressure for vocal system complexity.195 We believe the experiments included in the previous
chapters provide a modest start in pursuing the empirical evidence required to support or falsify
the SCHC.

Philosophical and Scientific Parallels
As we have investigated morality from an evolutionary perspective, certain parallels
begin to emerge between evolutionary models and classical philosophy. These parallels are too
numerous to relate here, but a couple of them deserve brief mention. Aristotle proposed a set of
human virtues and argued that an excess or deficiency in these virtues created a vice.196 Courage,
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for example, could be deficient in the form of cowardice or seen in the excess of rashness.
Augustine conceptualized virtue as the ordinate state of emotions.197 To translate this concept
into psychological terms, the Augustinian view proposed that with a given set of stimuli, such as
death of a loved one, there were some valid or invalid emotional responses for the individual,
such as grief or joy. Moral behavior, for Augustine, arose from the proper alignment of our
affections with nature. For both Aristotle and Augustine, nature, at least in part, was a judge of
morality. It was not a mere social innovation.
These two conceptualizations of morality can be translated into two hypotheses of a
scientific model. The hypothesis we would derive from Aristotle is that moral emotions are
adaptive in moderation. Any moral emotion, such as Panksepps’ FEAR system would only be
adaptive when in an intermediate zone. A complete lack of FEAR disables an individual from
perceiving and reacting against threat. An over-abundance of FEAR will interfere with other
motivations, such as those involved in resource seeking. This principle of the optimal
intermediate value is widely accepted in psychology under the Yerkes-Dodson Law.198
The Augustinian view that morality is attached to objects requires a little more
explanation. We can start this process by envisioning a certain stimulus. This stimulus may be
rewarding or threatening to the individual. From an Augustinian view, morality arises by the
proper calibration of the individual’s emotions to the stimulus. Threats should evoke FEAR in a
person or animal. Close relationships should evoke CARE. These simple examples can be
expanded to include all emotions and potential stimuli. The result of such an expansion would be
a type of emotional matrix for each of the stimuli to which the individual might be exposed.
Gregory, E. (2008). Augustine and politics as longing in the world. University of Missouri Press.
Yerkes, R. M., & Dodson, J. D. (1908). The relation of strength of stimulus to rapidity of habit‐formation.
Journal of comparative neurology, 18(5), 459-482.
197
198

93

Given the lifespan of an individual, this matrix would be extremely large: each potential stimulus
would have a corresponding weight from each emotion. Fortunately, the human brain seems
well-adept at such massive calculations. Just as DNA plays an incomprehensibly large role in the
formation of a person’s or animal’s physical structure, these massive matrices together would
form the ethos of that individual. But the Augustinian model becomes even more complex as we
envision these sets of matrices, or moral characters, interacting with each other. The forces of
psychology and sociology come to act at this level of operation. It is here that we should add to
the Augustine model the reminder that the forces of evolution are also functioning during these
interactions. There are objective fitness consequences for these exchanges. Changes in shared
cultural morality could lead to a type of egalitarianism, where every individual benefits from the
membership of the collective, to a repressive tyranny where a select few benefit at the expense of
many, or the extinction of humanity. The evolutionary map of humanity is open and uncertain.

Some Dangers of Manipulating Morality
As our understanding of morality increases, a serious problem is almost certain to
emerge. This problem is highlighted in multitudes of dystopian novels and films and lucidly
described to certain educated audiences during the last World War.199 Scientific discoveries that
unlock the power to manipulate our world are often a double-edged sword. We see this in
physics, where unlocking the secrets of the atom produce both quantum computing and nuclear
bombs. We see this in microbiology, where unlocking the secrets of DNA produce the ability to
cure ancient diseases or to end civilization with a pandemic. The accumulation of knowledge,
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especially scientific knowledge, can hold dangers. The fruits of science can be used by humanity
to cure disease and fight oppression, or can used to create disease or forge the tools of
oppression. The difference in how these tools are used is a moral question. But the subject of
these investigations is morality. This raises a paradox for scientists. How can a scientist
objectively study morality without sacrificing their own moral character, which might prevent
these discoveries from being converted into tools of oppression and destruction? Complete
objectivity, in the field of morality, is both impossible and undesirable. It would be like taking
out our own eyes to examine them more closely. A dangerous moral blindness to one’s own
motivations can only result.
To many, the answers to moral problems reside in technology and education. It may be
very tempting to try to improve human moral nature as soon as tools for doing so become
available. Gene therapy, in utero hormone treatment, and moral conditioning in infancy/early
childhood could be employed in an attempt to improve human moral nature. But until a
comprehensive model of morality is fully formulated we are mostly working in the dark. J.B.S.
Haldane reminded us long ago that the rule in evolution was not change for the better, but
degeneration. Most genetic lines end in extinction. Most mutations are malevolent.200 The
popular notion that evolution will inevitably lead to human progress is completely unsupported
in the sciences of physics or biology. The evolutionary odds, and the arrow of entropy, point in
the other direction.
It is hoped that Haldane’s reminder might give us pause if we ever consider using the
scientifically-derived powers of manipulation to drastically alter human moral sentiments.
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Knowing so little of the relationship between the ethos, the group’s Morality (Culture), and the
prospects for long-term adaptiveness, what assurance do we have that we can beat Haldane’s
odds of degeneration? And who can be trusted with this great power to alter human nature? Can
we safely assume that architects of such a moral improvement initiative will be the most
compassionate and fair-minded among us? And how would these moral innovators maintain their
own sense of compassion and fairness once they learn the biological “ingredients” and the
conditioning procedure which create compassion and fairness in their subjects? Since I do not
know the answers to these questions, it seems imperative to seriously question what is meant by
those who use words such as moral or social “progress” or “improvement.” With the science of
morality in its infancy, it is a quite sensible to want a clear and specific definition of what
constitutes moral progress before enacting irrevocable changes toward such a vaguely defined
goal. Change only becomes progress if it succeeds in overcoming “Haldane’s odds.”
Proponents of moral improvement may object to this reticence by claiming that humans
have always attempted to improve morality either directly through education and or indirectly by
mate selection. The claim could be made that moral innovators are merely attempting to use
better tools to accomplish this ancient goal. There is, at the very least, a veneer of validity to this
criticism. It is certainly true that humans have always attempted to create certain moral
phenotypes through education and parenting. And we can safely assume that an individual’s
moral reputation played some role in the sexual selection in human history. But the difference
moving forward will be dramatic. Gene therapy, almost by definition, replaces the process of
natural selection with the process of artificial selection. Modern education is replacing social
modeling, conducted in all the diversity of a working society, with abstract instruction,
conducted in the artificial homogeneity of the classroom. The powers to alter human morality
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will be orders of magnitude greater with emerging scientific tools. We may be looking toward a
future where the power to generate our moral phenotypes will be greatly magnified and under the
control of a small cohort of technical specialists. The central question remains concerning the
morality of these technical specialists. Will the science of morality be mastered by those who
truly know how morality operates and seek the betterment of all, malevolent manipulators who
view morality as a tool to their own ends, or meddling novices who are quite willing to chart a
new course for humanity based upon scanty and insufficient evidence? We know not.
The opinion offered here is here is that science should move very cautiously in the field
of morality. We also propose that scientists studying morality have a duty to strengthen their own
moral characters with the study of history, philosophy, religion, and daily practice. I would not
trust, as one small example, someone who delighted in being cruel to their own dog to chart the
future of human morality. That is, the scientists of morality should be moral themselves, and we
need vast amounts of time to know what being moral means.
We have chosen to contribute to the field of moral research a study examining the ethos
of the Carolina chickadee. Investigating the cooperative system of chickadees provides several
advantages. The relative simplicity of both the social system and neuroanatomy of the chickadee
provides an opportunity to examine the rudiments of cooperation in a less perplexing context.
Chickadees, being an avian species, allow an additional opportunity to examine some convergent
aspects of moral development. Perhaps the most important advantage to using a comparative
approach for studying moral systems is that the negative consequences for manipulating these
systems would be less catastrophic for humanity. Tolstoy long ago observed humanity’s tendency
to dismantle our objects of study, like a watch, to understand their internal mechanisms. If we are
to attempt this procedure with morality, might it not be prudent to begin with a different species?
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A simple watch is easier to study than a more complex one; and to lose “the spring” in human
morality is to jeopardize all.
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Appendix 1: Carolina Chickadee Food Preferences

MW = Mealworms, SF= Safflower, SN = Sunflower
TR = Preference, low number indicate high preference.
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Appendix 2: Food Type Raw Data
Site

Cond

Calls

Intro

C

Dh

D

Boone Camp

Abundance

0

0

0

0

0

Boone Camp

Baseline

0

0

0

0

0

Boone Camp

Mealworm

2

2

4

0

9

Boone Farm

5 Seed

0

0

0

0

0

Boone Farm

Abundance

0

0

0

0

0

Boone Farm

Mealworm

1

0

0

1

1

Boyscout

5 Seed

0

0

0

0

0

Boyscout

Abundance

5

5

0

0

40

Boyscout

Baseline

2

2

4

0

9

Boyscout

Mealworm

6

7

0

0

45

Circle

5 Seed

0

0

0

0

0

Circle

Abundance

0

0

0

0

0

Circle

Baseline

0

0

0

0

0

Circle

Mealworm

1

0

0

0

0

Dads

5 Seed

5

16

0

0

4

Dads

Abundance

0

0

0

0

0

Dads

Baseline

2

7

3

0

9

Dads

Mealworm

0

0

0

0

0

Dam

Abundance

0

0

0

0

0

Dam

Mealworm

2

2

1

0

13

Dump

Mealworm

0

0

0

0

0

E Cabin

5 Seed

0

0

0

0

0

E Cabin

Abundance

0

0

0

0

0

E Cabin

Mealworm

2

2

0

0

6

E Camp

Abundance

0

0

0

0

0

E Camp

Baseline

0

0

0

0

0

Fitness

5 Seed

0

0

0

0

0

Fitness

Abundance

4

4

8

0

7

Fitness

Baseline

0

0

0

0

0

Fitness

Mealworm

1

2

1

5

0

Homestead

5 Seed

0

0

0

0

0

Homestead

Abundance

0

0

0

0

0

Homestead

Baseline

0

0

0

0

0

Marine

5 Seed

0

0

0

0

0

Marine

Abundance

0

0

0

0

0

Marine

Baseline

0

0

0

0

0
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Marine

Mealworm

10

9

0

6

28

Quarry

5 Seed

3

6

0

0

5

Quarry

Abundance

0

0

0

0

0

Quarry

Baseline

1

1

0

0

3

Quarry

Mealworm

0

0

0

0

0

Riverbend

5 Seed

0

0

0

0

0

Riverbend

Abundance

4

12

0

1

49

Riverbend

Baseline

0

0

0

0

0

Riverbend

Mealworm

1

1

0

0

1
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Appendix 3: Study 1, C-Notes by Condition

N=10 (5 Seed)
N=13 (Abundance)
N=10 (Baseline)
N=12 (Mealworm)
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Appendix 4: Study 1, D-notes by Condition

N=10 (5 Seed)
N=13 (Abundance)
N=10 (Baseline)
N=12 (Mealworm)
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Appendix 5: Study 2, Owl vs. Goose Call Raw Data

Site
Boone Camp
Boone Camp
Boone Farm
Boone Farm
Boyscout
Boyscout
Dads
Dads
Dam
Dam
E Cabin
E Cabin
E Camp
E Camp
X_Fitness
X_Heritage
Homestead
Homestead
Marine
Marine
Ramp
Ramp
Quarry
Quarry
Riverbend
Riverbend

Cond
Goose
Owl
Goose
Owl
Goose
Owl
Goose
Owl
Goose
Owl
Goose
Owl
Goose
Owl
Owl
Goose
Goose
Owl
Goose
Owl
Goose
Owl
Goose
Owl
Goose
Owl

Bird T#
1
2
2
2
3
2
1
2
3
2
2
1
3
4
2
2
1
3
3
2
1
2
2
1
2
2

Calls
0
0
0
2
1
3
0
4
5
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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intro
0
0
0
4
2
0
0
9
2
0
0
0
0
0
5
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

C
0
0
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Dh
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

D
0
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
39
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Appendix 6: Seed vs. No Seed Call Raw Data

Site
10M
15I
17A
1K
4A+
B1B
B3F
BooneCamp
BooneFarm
Boyscout
Circle
Dads
Ecabin
Fitness
Heritage
Ramp
17L
B2AR7
Yard
Ecamp

Condition
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS
NS

Calls
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
0

Intro
0
1
1
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
1
0

C
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0

D
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
4
0
0
2
9
0

NS

0

0

0

0

Condition
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S

Calls
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
2
5
0

Intro
0
8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
3
0
21
4
0

C
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

D
0
24
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
0
15
0
0
32
0

S
S

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0
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Appendix 7: Study 3, C-Notes by Condition

N=16 (Seed and No Seed)
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Appendix 8: Study 3, D-Notes by Condition

N=16 (Seed and No Seed)
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Appendix 9: Regional Analysis

N=36 (KY)
N=71 (TN)
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